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ABSTRACT
Menevis Cilizoglu: Ending Economic Coercion and the Consequences of Sanctions Removal
(Under the direction of Navin A. Bapat)
Economic sanctions have been increasingly used to advance a range of foreign policy goals.
Research on economic sanctions has produced significant advancement on our understanding of the
causes and effects of the usage of these tools. However, less attention has been paid to the decision to
end sanctions and the consequences of this decision. This dissertation aims to fill this gap by asking
three interrelated questions. First, how do economic sanctions end? To answer this question, I present
a formal theory of the process through which sanctions are lifted. Specifically, I identify the obstacles
to end sanctions and demonstrate how these obstacles can be overcome. I find that sanctions are more
likely to end if imposers of sanctions can successfully monitor their targets’ compliance behavior,
but only if targets find promised sanctions relief attractive. Second, what are the consequences of
ending sanctions and how do the domestic and economic environment created by sanctions removal
influence the possibility of sanctions recurrence? I show that sanctions recurrence is not always a
reaction to the policies adopted by the target following sanctions removal, but is primarily driven by
domestic politics of the imposer country. Finally, how does ending sanctions influence the investment
decisions of private firms based in the imposer country? To answer this question, I examine how firms
assess risk when considering investing in economies that were previously targeted with sanctions by
their home governments. I show that firms based in the sender country increase their investment in
target countries following sanctions removal only if they receive credible assurances from their home
government and host government that sanctions will not recur. To test the hypotheses generated in
each chapter, I employ a variety of statistical tools and use several data sources, including the Threats
and Impositions of Economic Sanctions (TIES), Change in Source of Leader Support (CHISOLS),
and Correlates of War (COW) datasets, among others.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In 2016, the United States moved towards friendlier relations with Cuba, Iran, and Myanmar
by significantly easing or ending decades-long harsh sanctions on them. These decisions have
provided new lucrative opportunities for American firms and benefited American consumers, while
also allowing Cuban, Iranian and Burmese economies to begin re-integrating into international trade
and financial networks. In addition to the economic win-win situation these sanction removals have
created, they have raised hopes about the future normalization and strengthening of political ties
between the U.S. and its long-standing adversaries.
Cuba has been under harsh economic sanctions since 1959, when Fidel Castro came to power
overthrowing a U.S. backed regime and established a socialist state allied with the Soviet Union. Over
the years, the U.S. instituted a full economic embargo, froze Cuban assets, imposed stringent travel
restrictions, and labeled Cuba a state sponsor of terrorism. The U.S. has sanctioned Cuba longer
than any other country, yet, after sixty years of isolationism, antagonism, and distrust, the sanctions
removal process began in 2009. Between the years 2009 and 2016, the former President Obama
eased restrictions on remittances and travel, legalized American telecommunication companies to do
business in Cuba, re-opened embassies after fifty-four years, and removed Cuba from the list of state
sponsors of terrorism.
Iran has also been the target of decades-long U.S. sanctions. The 2000s were marked with
numerous attempts of nuclear negotiations by the EU-31 and the P5+12 with the Iranian regime.
These multilateral efforts were successful to convince Iran to sign the Additional Protocol3 of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), make commitments to suspend their enrichment-related activities,
and allow international inspectors to monitor their progress. Over time, Iranian participation in
nuclear negotiations proved to be nothing more than a stalling tactic. Between the years 2010 and
1France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
2Five permanent members of the UN Security Council (U.S., U.K., China, Russia, France) and Germany.
3The Additional Protocol provides the International Atomic Energy Agency with access to declared and undeclared
nuclear facilities of the signatory states.
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2013, however, the harshening economic pressure on Iran by denying access to SWIFT, improved
enforcement of trade and financial restrictions, the collapse of the price of oil, and denial of access to
credit forced the regime to the negotiation table. Finally, in 2015, a Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) signed between Iran and the P5+1, requiring Iran to limit its uranium enrichment and
freeze further nuclear developments. In exchange, the coalition has committed to provide sanctions
relief, lift the oil embargo and restrictions on financial transactions, and repatriate assets frozen
abroad.
Lastly, consider the Myanmar case. The U.S. imposed economic sanctions in response to the
military junta taking power in Myanmar in a coup in 1988 and the junta’s suppression of protests,
detention of political prisoners and vast human rights violations. The military junta in 2011 officially
dissolved and established a civillian parliament, despite the continued dominance of the military
in the government. The new civillian government spearheaded a series of political and economic
reforms. These reforms led the U.S. to ease sanctions on the country, re-establish a USAID mission
and name its first ambassador to the country in twenty-two years.
These three high-profile sanctions cases are very unique, yet they share major commonalities.
First, all three cases ended with a negotiated settlement. Neither Cuba, nor Iran, nor Myanmar
acquiesced fully to the demands that the U.S. put forth at the time of the initial sanctions imposition.
Cuba is still a socialist government, Iran still has a nuclear program, and Myanmar still commits
serious human rights violations. Second, the relations remain strained in three of these cases after the
removal of sanctions. In fact, President Donald Trump imposed additional economic restrictions on
all three of these countries shortly after his predecessor’s moves to normalize relations. Third, the
easing or the lifting of sanctions in all three cases were a part of a reconciliation strategy adopted by
the former President Barack Obama.
The sanctions against Cuba, Iran and Myanmar, their termination, and the political, economic,
and domestic implications of ending these sanctions motivate the research questions this dissertation
asks and the theoretical approach it adopts. First, around 40 percent of all economic sanctions
imposed between the years 1945 and 2005 ended with a negotiated settlement, just like the cases
against Cuba, Iran, and Myanmar did. This necessitates the exploration of the factors that facilitate
negotiations, and the successful implementation of sanctions removal deals. The majority of the
economic sanctions literature examines when economic sanctions succeed, however, theories of
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how success is achieved are underdeveloped in sanctions termination and effectiveness literatures.
Therefore, in this dissertation I ask the following question: How do economic sanctions end?
Second, the scholarly interest in economic sanctions dissipates when sanctions end. How sender-
target relations evolve following sanctions removal and how the decision to end sanctions shape the
post-sanctions environment are questions that are not previously explored. In an effort to fill this
gap, the second question of interest is: what are the domestic, political, and economic implications
of ending sanctions for the sender and the target states? One aspect of the post-sanctions removal
period I explore is sanctions recurrence. 37 percent of all sanctions imposed between the years 1945
and 2005 recurred within the ten year following the removal of initial of sanctions, just like sanctions
recurrences in the cases of Cuba, Iran, and Myanmar. This begs the analysis of the conditions under
which sanctions recur.
Third, how do target states like Cuba, Iran, and Myanmar recover following sanctions removal?
Following the move to ease restrictions on Myanmar, multinational companies began showing
interest in investment in the country; while Cuba is still not an attractive destination for international
investment. Iran, on the other hand, receives a significant amount of European countries; while
American firms are very cautious against doing business with or in Iran. To explore the differences in
the economic recovery of target countries following sanctions removal, the third question of interest
is: what are the conditions conducive to investment in countries previously targeted with economic
sanctions?
How do economic sanctions end? What are the domestic, political, and economic implications
of ending sanctions for the sender and the target states? When do economic sanctions recur? How do
targets recover in the post-sanctions period? I answer these questions in three empirical chapters. The
remainder of this introductory chapter motivates the project, discusses methodological approaches
used in pursuit of the research questions, and provides an organizational outline for the dissertation.
Sanctions Literature: A Missing Piece
Economic sanctions receive great attention from political scientists and policy-makers alike. This
interest is a reflection of the increasing popularity of economic sanctions as a coercive foreign policy
tool. In the sixty years period between 1945 to 2005, there were 845 unique sanctions imposed
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and the numbers have grown significantly since 2005.4 The most recent cases such as sanctions on
Russia, North Korea, and Venezuela imposed by the U.S. are just a few examples of the efforts to
pressure countries into making policy concessions by restricting trade and financial interactions with
them.
Sanctioning states (senders) limit trade or financial transactions with sanctioned states (targets)
and demand policy change that must be met before economic relations can resume (Haufbauer et al.,
2009; Morgan, Bapat and Krustev, 2009a; Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi, 2014). These demands can
cover a wide range of issue areas, such as improving human rights, terminating the target’s support
of non-state actors, ending weapons proliferation, solving territorial disputes, and retaliating for
alignment choices. When pursuing these goals, senders choose from a variety of sanctioning tools,
such as total embargoes, import or export restrictions, asset freezes, termination of foreign aid or
travel bans. Figure 1 shows how these coercive efforts have become a common foreign policy tool
states have employed with increasing frequency, and this trend is evident especially after the end of
the Cold War.
Figure 1: The Frequency of Sanctions Onset
The scholarly interest in economic sanctions has matched the increasing popularity of economic
sanctions as a coercive foreign policy tool. A considerable amount of scholarship has investigated
when economic sanctions succeed to convince the target state to alter its policies in line with the
4The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) Dataset, the most complete dataset on economic sanctions,
covers the 1945-2005 period.
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demands of the sender. Most of these studies observe target behavior at the time of termination
and consider a sanctions episode successful if the target capitulates at least partially or a negotiated
settlement is reached. However, the question of how sanctions succeed is often black-boxed and the
process through which success is achieved is overlooked in existing theories of sanctions termination
and effectiveness. Moreover, the centrality of the question of “success” to the sanctions literature
leads to the dissipation of scholarly interest in economic sanctions when they end, with or without
success. Very little research has explored the consequences of the decision to end sanctions and
analyzed sender-target relations following sanctions removal.
In this dissertation, I am primarily interested in understanding the process through which
sanctions end. Figure 2 depicts the frequency of sanctions removal over time. As expected, sanctions
removal is a common phenomenon, just like sanctions onset is, yet, the scholarly interest in sanctions
termination does not match with the scholarly interest in sanctions onset. This discrepancy motivates
this project.
Figure 2: The Frequency of Sanctions Removal
Methodology
To develop a theory of sanctions removal and the consequences of lifting sanctions, I use several
theoretical and empirical strategies. In Chapter 2, I adopt an Empirical Implications of Theoretical
Models (EITM) approach to explain when economic sanctions can be lifted while senders are facing a
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trade-off between reversing sanctions’ inefficiencies and risking contributing to the targets’ offensive
behavior. I choose to use this approach for several reasons. First, sanctions removal is a product of
bargaining between the sender and the target, where the decisions each side make are interdependent
decisions that are made strategically. Game theory allows me to model strategic interaction between
senders and targets. Moreover, it allows me to generate hypotheses suitable for empirical testing.
I empirically test the hypotheses presented in this dissertation primarily using time-series cross-
sectional data structured dyadically. I employ a variety of data sources, including but not limited
to the Threats and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES), Change in Source of Leader Support
(CHISOLS), and various Correlates of War (COW) datasets, along with some originally collected
data for this project.
Outline of the Dissertation
The organization of this dissertation will proceed as follows. In the second chapter, I develop a game
theoretic model of the bargaining between senders and targets over ending sanctions and identify
the conditions under which economic sanctions end. Can senders end economic coercion without
the fear of strengthening their targets’ capabilities? Can targets credibly refrain themselves from
channeling the gains from resumed economic transactions into future offensive behavior? What are
the obstacles that senders and targets face when negotiating over ending sanctions and what are the
mechanism through which these obstacles can be overcome? Chapter 3 examines the period after
these obstacles are overcome and sanctions end. Specifically, I ask the following questions: What are
the domestic and economic implications of sanctions removal in the sender and the target country?
What are the conditions under which post-sanctions environment triggers sanctions recurrence? Do
senders renew sanctions to punish targets’ offensive behavior in the aftermath of sanctions removal
or in response to their own domestic considerations? Chapter 4 continues to explore the aftermath of
sanctions removal and investigates the impact of sanctions removal on private economic actors based
in the sender country. What are the conditions conducive of increasing foreign direct investment into
countries previously targeted with economic sanction? How do firms assess the long-term safety of
their investments in target countries? Lastly, drawing on the answer I provide to these questions in my
empirical chapters, Chapter 5 discusses the policy implications of this dissertation. The conclusion
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also outlines my future research program that can build on this dissertation, and the questions that
this project can open the doors to.
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CHAPTER 2: ENDING SANCTIONS IN THE SHADOW OF BARGAINING PROBLEMS
In July 2015, Iran, the P5+1 countries,5 and the EU reached a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) requiring Iran to limit its uranium enrichment and freeze further nuclear developments. In
exchange, the coalition committed to provide sanctions relief, lift the oil embargo and restrictions
on financial transactions, and repatriate assets frozen abroad.6 In January 2016, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that Iran had fulfilled its key nuclear commitments, which
ended nuclear-related sanctions that have devastated the Iranian economy. Since then, the agency
has published nine other reports attesting to Iranian compliance. Proponents of the deal highlight
the IAEA’s extremely rigorous verification regime. Former Secretary of State John Kerry stressed
that, “if Iran fails to comply, they are absolutely clear that they will quickly know it and respond
accordingly.”7 However, concerns remain that Iran will channel the gains from sanctions relief into
its nuclear program. President Trump stated on numerous occasions that “the deal allows Iran to
sprint towards a rapid nuclear weapons breakout.”8 This raises the following questions: Can imposers
of sanctions end economic coercion and provide sanctions relief given the fears of strengthening their
opponents’ capabilities and uncertainties about their targets’ intentions? Can targets credibly refrain
themselves from channeling the gains from resumed economic transactions into future offensive
behavior?
This study identifies information and commitment problems as key barriers to sanctions removal
and resumption of profitable transactions between senders and targets. I argue that sanctions removal
and the subsequent sanctions relief create temptations for targets to renege on their sanctions removal
deals. Given these temptations, a successful sanctions removal bargain must overcome the problem of
5The United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, China, and Germany.
6See “http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf” for the full JCPOA docu-
ment.
7Kerry, J. “Remarks Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs”, 28 July 2015, Washington, DC.
8United States, Office of the Press Secretary.“Remarks by President Trump on Iran Strategy.” The White House, 13
October 2017, Retrieved from: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/10/13/remarks-president-trump-iran-
strategy
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monitoring and senders must continuously enforce compliance. In other words, any sanctions removal
deal must ensure that the target state will not have incentives to exploit the deal, and the sender must
have assurances that any target non-compliance will be detected. Using a game theoretic model and
empirical analysis, I demonstrate that senders gain this confidence if there is a dense information flow
between senders and targets facilitated by joint intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Institutional
connectedness and channels for information sharing enable senders to be informed about targets’
compliance and enforce sanctions removal deals. However, a dense information flow can facilitate
sanctions removal only if the value the target places on resumed economic interactions with the sender
is high. In other words, dense information flows need to be complemented by attractive economic
inducements. Otherwise, the proposed sanctions relief cannot incentivize targets to credibly commit
to make policy concessions and open themselves up to increased scrutiny of senders.
Linking Sanctions Removal and Bargaining Failures
Economic sanctions are foreign policy tools that one or more countries use to limit or end economic
relations with a target country and to persuade that country to change one or more of its policies
(Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi, 2014; Hufbauer et al., 2007). The existing literature establishes that
economic sanctions generate varying degrees of costs, either directly by freezing or limiting economic
and financial transactions, or indirectly by creating market imperfections through fines on individuals
and businesses, travel bans or increased uncertainty about the economic stability of the targeted
country (Eyler, 2007; Hufbauer and Oegg, 2003; Dizaji and Bergeijk, 2013; Lektzian and Biglaiser,
2013). These imperfections may create immediate loss of economic efficiency and short-term costs
of adjusting to new trade patterns, which in turn may risk reduction in future growth (Farmer, 2000).
Moreover, these costs and market imperfections are often absorbed by private firms (Biglaiser and
Lektzian, 2011). Additionally, existing research shows that sanctions destabilize leaders politically
(Marinov, 2005; Escriba-Folch and Wright, 2010), give businesses a strong incentive to use criminal
trade routes (Andreas, 2005; Early, 2011), cause more political violence (Allen, 2004), worsen
human rights conditions (Weiss et al., 1997; Peksen, 2009; Lopez and Cortright, 1997), increase
repression (Wood, 2008), contribute to the escalation of conflict violence (Hultman and Peksen,
2017) and reduce the level of democratic freedoms in target countries (Peksen and Drury, 2010).
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While most analyses only examine short-term effects of sanctions, few analyze the effect of these
costs over time. The literature on sanctions effectiveness focuses heavily on the target’s behavior at
the time of termination (Allen, 2009; Cortright and Lopez, 2002; Drezner, 2011; Lektzian and Souva,
2007). However, only a few studies examine how circumstances change over time in a sanctions
episode and how success is achieved (Krustev and Morgan, 2011; Dorussen and Mo, 2001; Bolks and
Al-Sowayel, 2000). Sanctions are time inconsistent for both the sender and the target. In other words,
their preferences and bargaining positions change over the course of a sanctions episode. First, the
target’s preferences over its offensive policy might change during a sanctions episode. For instance,
if the target of a human rights sanction experiences a leadership turnover and if the new leader has a
democratization agenda, the human rights violations that used to be profitable for the target might
cease to be desirable (McGillivray and Stam, 2004).
Alternatively, the value the target places on its behavior can remain the same; but the costs of
pursuing the behavior might increase over time. If sanctions fail to immediately compel targets
into compliance, the inefficiencies continue for extended periods of time. As sanctions endure,
the accumulation of these costs might create incentives for senders and targets to negotiate over
ending sanctions. The decision to end economic coercion not only reverses the inefficiencies
created by sanctions, but also generates more wealth by resuming profitable economic interactions.
Therefore, any negotiated settlement over ending sanctions and the subsequent resumption of
economic transactions would allow the rival states to obtain the gains from resumed trade and achieve
a Pareto-improving outcome. The changing political environment, the accumulated inefficiencies,
and the desirability of preserving trade gains might force senders and targets to re-evaluate their
policy positions, thus offering a possibility of sanctions removal.
Even if ending sanctions and achieving economic peace might become preferable over time,
commitment and information problems pose barriers to successful negotiation (Fearon, 1995). As
Powell (2004, 2006) demonstrates, adversaries are often unable to credibly commit themselves to
following through on an agreement or may be incentivized to renege. The problem is exacerbated
when the agreement makes one adversary more powerful in a way that will contribute to its future
bargaining power (Fearon, 1996; Chadefaux, 2011; McCormack and Pascoe, 2015; Krainin, 2017).
Any agreement reached over ending sanctions will provide the target state with greater access to
resources through sanctions relief, thereby strengthening the target state’s economy. The extent to
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which the target’s economy will become stronger in the post-sanctions period is conditional upon
the extent to which sanctions were able to harm the target’s economy. However, even in the case
of minor cost sanctions, sanctions removal reverses market imperfections and eases doing business
with the target country by providing confidence to third parties and the market. If the target’s
economy strengthens, this will undermine its incentives to honor its commitments to alter its behavior
(Goemans, 2000; Leventoglu and Slantchev, 2007). On the contrary, it might create strong incentives
for the target to exploit the deal by channeling the gains from sanctions relief into its foreign policy
challenges. Therefore, removing economic sanctions require the rival states to overcome commitment
problems. More specifically, the target needs to certify and credibly signal that it will not pursue its
offensive behavior once sanctions are lifted and the sender must continuously enforce compliance
(Schultz, 2010).
To overcome commitment problems created by sanctions relief and to successfully enforce
sanctions removal deals, senders need to be informed about targets’ compliance behavior. Not
knowing if the target intends to alter its behavior in exchange for sanctions relief creates an obstacle
for reaching sanctions removal deals. Moreover, not being able to acquire credible information
about targets’ behavior inhibits senders’ ability to enforce the deal’s terms. This link between
monitoring and enforcement during sanctions removal processes can be exemplified by how Sierra
Leone sanctions ended. The UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Sierra Leone in 1997,
barring the supply of arms and petroleum products, in response to the atrocities by the Armed Forces
Revolutionary Council junta during the Sierra Leone Civil War. The civil war was officially declared
ended in 2002; however, sanctions remained in place for another eight years, and its scope has
expanded to include restrictions on the import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone.9 The UN was
concerned that sanctions relief prior to full disarmament may help non-government forces to mobilize
and destabilize the country (Biersteker et al., 2018). To ensure the government’s compliance, UN
Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding missions were mandated to monitor disarmament and post-conflict
transition, and served as a facilitator of sanctions removal by verifying full disarmament and peace.
What prevented sanctions removal for 8 years was the uncertainty about the future of the country,
9UN Security Council Resolution 1306
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and whether Sierra Leone can credibly commit not to channel the gains from sanctions relief into a
future conflict.
Most work analyzes the two bargaining problems separately, isolating information or commit-
ment problems, with a few exceptions (Wolford, Reiter and Carrubba, 2011; Bas and Schub, 2017).
However, these problems interact, and complement one another. In the process of sanctions removal,
asymmetric information becomes a source of commitment problems. Therefore, overcoming infor-
mation problems is a prerequisite for overcoming commitment problems. Since target states have
unilateral control over their policies and an ability to pursue their foreign policy challenges covertly,
reaching deals and enforcing them necessitate overcoming information problems. If there is an
expectation that the sender will not be able to overcome the problem of monitoring, targets cannot
credibly commit to alter their behavior while enjoying the gains from sanctions relief. Therefore,
reaching a successful sanctions removal bargain requires senders and targets to simultaneously
overcome commitment and information problems.
This dynamic can be exemplified by the removal of decades-long sanctions on Myanmar. When
Suu Kyi, an icon of democracy who was under house arrest for resisting Myanmar’s military junta,
won the elections in 2015 and became the country’s civillian leader, the US perceived it as an
indication that the government had made “substantial progress towards democratization.”10 Suu
Kyi’s victory was seen as a change in the preferences of Myanmar and an indication of the ability
of the country to commit to improve its human rights conditions while receiving previously frozen
government aid from the US. However, today, Suu Kyi is heavily criticized for her inaction for the
country’s brutal suppression of the Rohingya. At the time of removal, the U.S. was not fully informed
about whether Suu Kyi can diminish the role of military in the country and the extent to which she
can improve Myanmar’s human rights practices. In other words, the U.S. lacked information on the
extent to which the country can credibly commit to alter its behavior while enjoying the gains from
sanctions relief and potentially overestimated the positive implications of Suu Kyi’s victory.
As seen in the Myanmar case, overcoming information problems is often challenging. During
sanctions removal negotiations, some targets might actually be sincere and willing to reverse their
10Harris, Gardiner. “Obama Lifts Some Sanctions Against Myanmar” (2016, December 2), The
New York Times. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/02/us/politics/
obama-lifts-sanctions-myanmar.html
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offensive behavior in exchange for sanctions relief. However, some others might be opportunistic
and participate in sanctions removal negotiations in the hopes to use the gains from sanctions relief
to advance their policies that initially triggered sanctions. Such opportunistic targets might also have
incentives to misrepresent their true intentions at the negotiation table and indicate a false willingness
to make policy concessions in exchange for sanctions removal. The key dilemma is that senders are
often uncertain about whether the target is opportunistic and will exploit sanctions relief or is sincere
and will make policy concessions.
Furthermore, detection of reneging on sanctions removal agreements and monitoring the extent to
which targets are altering their behavior are not always possible. The possibility of escaping detection
might incentivize targets to cheat and intensify commitment problems; thus, jeopardize sanctions
removal (Chayes and Chayes, 1993; Marcoux and Urpelainen, 2013; Mitchell, 2002; Bednar, 2006).
In the cases of nuclear proliferation, support to terrorism, or acquiring strategic material, the covert
nature of the offensive behavior is evident. But even in the cases of human rights violations or
one-sided violence, the uncertainty remains. Targets might commit to make concessions by signing
a human rights treaty or passing domestic reform bills, but enforcement often remains uncertain.
Even in cases where domestic violence is observed by the senders, the perpetrator of violence can
be challenging to identify, as governments often deny their involvement, and blame the violence on
non-government groups.
Senders’ uncertainty about targets’ intentions, coupled with the possibility that targets can get
away with their non-compliance may lead sanctions to persist despite strong economic incentives to
reverse their inefficiencies. Therefore, sanctions removal and achieving economic peace require rival
states to ameliorate bargaining problems. More specifically, targets should certify their compliance
and give senders reliable assurances that the deal’s terms will be honored, and senders need to devise
mechanisms to overcome the problem of monitoring.
The question of how to overcome bargaining problems is central to the international relations
literature on conflict and cooperation. The role of third parties in assisting conflicting states has
attracted significant scholarly attention. Specifically, the literature identifies IGOs as instrumental
actors that alleviate information and commitment problems by mitigating uncertainty and increasing
flow of information among members, reducing communication costs, and providing resources for
enforcement (Abbott and Snidal, 1998; Lohmann, 1997; Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Mitchell
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and Hensel, 2007; Botcheva and Martin, 2001). Moreover, interactions through greater number
of IGOs may lead to greater interest convergence and create increasing opportunities to exchange
ideas and build trust (Johnston, 2001; Bearce and Bondanelle, 2007), regardless of the mandate
of the IGO (Greenhill, 2010; Ingram, Robinson and Busch, 2005). Some IGOs can also serve as
active information providers and monitor member states’ actions and treaty compliance. Institutional
connectedness can also create more channels for senders to link the issue under contention with
another issue area that targets might prioritize over their offensive behavior (Haas, 1980; Lohmann,
1997).
I argue that institutional connectedness creates formal and informal avenues for senders to
gather information about targets’ intentions at the negotiation table and their compliance behavior.
The information available through these institutional channels might not be available to senders in
the absence of such connectedness; therefore, joint institutions are key in ameliorating bargaining
problems embedded in sanctions removal processes. Specifically, the information flow between
senders and targets facilitated through IGOs enables senders to enforce the deal’s terms (Fearon,
1998). If senders can assure continuous enforcement of the deal, this also induces target cooperation
and discourages cheating. The increased possibility of detection will help targets to credibly signal
their willingness to make policy concessions and increase the likelihood that they will participate in
negotiations over sanctions removal only when they are sincere (Von Stein, 2005). To identify when
institutional channels can help solve bargaining problems and facilitate sanctions removal, I now
turn to the formal model.
Theory of Sanctions Removal
Figure 1 presents a simplified model of negotiations between a sender (S) and a target (T) over
sanctions removal in exchange for policy concessions from T. Prior to the start of the game, T engages
in a behavior that is offensive to S, such as providing support to terrorist organizations, violating
human rights, or enriching uranium. T’s behavior leads to sanctions imposition by S in order to
convince T to reverse its policy. Over time, inefficiencies of economic sanctions accumulate for
both S and T, and may also diminish T’s ability to pursue its offensive behavior. Therefore, both
countries have an incentive to negotiate ending sanctions and resuming mutually beneficial economic
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transactions. The problem, however, is that S is uncertain about the extent to which T can credibly
commit to alter its offensive behavior while enjoying the gains from sanctions relief.
Figure 3: Sanctions Removal Game
This situation can be modeled as a signaling game, where T has private information about
its intentions to make policy concessions and the value it places on its policy. Nature begins the
game by selecting the target’s type. T1 is the sincere type, which is not interested in continuing
its offensive behavior. T2, on the other hand, is the opportunistic type, which seeks to use gains
from sanctions relief to pursue its offensive behavior. Assume that Nature chooses a sincere target
(T1) with probability Ω and an opportunistic target with probability (1 − Ω).11 Formally, the
underlying difference between the two types is the payoff they receive from their offensive policies.
T1 receives a payoff of 0 from both the continuation and the reversal of its policy.12 This can be due
to change in leadership in the target country or an economic or domestic shock. For instance, with
the election of Nelson Mandela in South Africa in 1994, the target country stopped receiving benefits
11Ω ∈ [0, 1].
12Substantively, T1’s preferences change after the impositions of sanctions and its offensive behavior ceases to be an
attractive policy.
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for the apartheid policies that initially triggered sanctions. Similarly, the new regime embraced an
antinuclear position and saw that the nuclear deterrent was a burden rather than a benefit Babbage
(2004). Therefore, South Africa has become a target that does not receive positive utility from the
policies that initially triggered sanctions.
T2, conversely, receives a payoff of 1 for the continuation of its policy and 0 for its reversal.
Substantively, this implies that T2’s preferences over its policies has remained the same since the
imposition. Iraqi efforts to conceal its nuclear program in 1990s to circumvent the UN sanctions
exemplify the preferences of T2. Iraq was cooperating with the UN by allowing the inspectors in the
country, while adopting deception techniques to be able to get away with its nuclear program. S, on
the other hand, strictly prefers the reversal of T’s offensive behavior. It receives a payoff of 0 if the
offensive policy remains in place and 1 if it is reversed.
Following Nature’s choice, T(1,2) decides whether to participate in negotiations with S over
the reversal of its policy.13 T’s decision to negotiate serves as a signal of its willingness to alter its
behavior in exchange for sanctions relief. Not participating in negotiations, on the other hand, is
perceived as an indication that T is continuing the pursuit of its offensive behavior. If T(1,2) plays
∼ Negotiate, the game ends in the status quo characterized by imposed sanctions. This outcome
produces a payoff of 0 for both T1 and S. T2, on the other hand, receives 1 for its policy. Sanctions
also diminish each players’ payoffs by c(T,S) ∈ [0, 1], capturing the economic inefficiencies and
transaction costs of sanctions. Sanctions impose varying degrees of economic costs on both senders
and targets and the c(T,S) parameter captures how costly sanctions are in a given sanctions episode.
If T participates in negotiations, this might be perceived as a weakness domestically. For instance,
the U.S. perceived Iranian President Rouhani’s declaration that Iran is ready for serious nuclear
talks as an opportune moment for a nuclear deal; however, Iranian hardliners stiffly opposed such
13Once sanctions are imposed, senders introduce the negotiation option to the game. The main goal of sanctions
imposition is to force targets to the negotiation table and bargain over ending sanctions in exchange for target concessions.
Therefore, the sanctioning process inherently has a negotiation offer made by S. T’s decision whether to Negotiate is
essentially a response to this inherent negotiation offer.
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negotiations.14 The domestic cost of negotiations are represented as  > 0 and all of T’s subsequent
payoffs are diminished by .15
Table 1: Parameters and Ranges
Parameter Interpretation Range
Ω S’s prior belief that T = T1 Ω ∈ [0, 1]
1− Ω S’s prior belief that T = T2 Ω ∈ [0, 1]
 T’s cost of participating in negotiations  > 0
c(T,S) Economic inefficiencies of sanctions c(T,S) ∈ [0, 1]
x Benefits of resumed economic interactions x > 0
θ Probability that S accurately detects T’s behavior θ ∈ [0, 1]
β(T,S) The harshening costs of economic sanctions β > 1
a S’s cost for failing to verify T’s behavior accurately a ∈ [0, 1]
If T(1,2) plays Negotiate, the game moves to S’s decision node. S either agrees to a sanctions
removal deal with T or ignores T’s signal. The information set indicates that S is uncertain about
whether T is sincere or opportunistic. If S rejects to make a deal with T, negotiations fail, sanctions
remain in place, and the game ends with the status quo maintained. If S agrees to a deal with T,
sanctions removal and the resumption of economic interactions are conditional upon the verification
of T’s policy concessions.
At its final decision node, T(1,2) plays either Comply or ∼ Comply, where compliance indicates
the reversal of its offensive behavior. Sanctions removal and the resumption of economic interactions
are conditional upon the verification of T’s policy concessions. S detects T’s behavior accurately with
probability θ and fails to do so with probability (1− θ).16 With probability θ, S removes sanctions
against complying targets and resumes trade, while keeping sanctions in place against non-complying
targets. With probability (1− θ), the verification process either incorrectly reveals a false positive
and leads to the punishment of a complying target, or reveals a false negative and leads to sanctions
removal against a non-complying target. Substantively, higher levels of θ indicate greater information
flow between S and T, thus a higher likelihood of detecting T’s behavior accurately.
14Erdbrink, Thomas.“Iranian General Criticizes U.N. Resolution on Nuclear Deal” (2015, July 20), The
New York Times. Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/world/middleeast/
iranian-general-criticizes-un-resolution-on-nuclear-deal.html?_r=0
15Allowing negotiations to be costless ( = 0) does not change the model’s implications, but creates a number of
redundant equilibria, by making T indifferent between ∼ Negotiate and ∼ Deal outcomes.
16θ ∈ [0, 1].
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If T plays Comply and makes policy concessions, S verifies this behavior with probability θ,
lifts sanctions and resumes economic interactions with T. The benefits of resumed interactions are
conceptualized as positive-sum, such that T and S receive x.17 The x parameter captures the value T
places on the sanctions relief. Therefore, T receives x− , accounting for the reversal of the policy
and negotiation costs. S receives 1 for the policy reversal, plus x for the resumed interactions.
If T complies, but S fails to verify this behavior with probability 1 − θ, sanctions remain in
place and they can potentially get costlier. This is represented by β(T,S) ≥ 1. If S thinks that the
target is still pursuing its offensive behavior, what T is punished for is not only its offensive behavior,
but also its participation in negotiations in bad faith and with no intention to comply. This might
also lead T to experience a costly deterioration of its reputation in future negotiations and trigger
other tangible costs such as foreign aid cuts or military escalation. Harshening of sanctions is how S
enforces sanctions removal deals. β = 1 indicates a case where S does not have the ability to enforce
the deal and the costs of sanctions remain the same even after discovering T’s non-compliance. On
the other hand, higher levels of β indicate a higher ability to enforce the deals’ terms by punishing
non-compliance.
If T plays ∼ Comply and continues its offensive behavior, S detects this accurately with
probability θ and punishes T with harsher sanctions.18 If S fails to detect T’s non-compliance
with probability (1− θ), sanctions are lifted and T can pursue its offensive behavior while enjoying
the gains from sanctions relief. The expectation that there is a possibility to get away with its offensive
behavior and to enjoy sanctions relief despite its non-compliance create commitment problems for
T2. While sanctions relief (x) is the only benefit that T1 gets for this outcome, T2 gets a payoff of
1 for its policy, along with the gains of resumed trade with S (x). This outcome presents the worst
case scenario for S, since its payoff is diminished by the additional costs of being cheated on without
being able to detect (a). On the other hand, it represents the best case scenario for T2.
17Allowing x to vary for T and S does not alter the implications of the model.
18It can be argued that it is easier to accurately verify the behavior of T1 than the behavior of T2. Capturing this requires
me to assign different probabilities to verify the behavior of each T. Adding this extra complication does not alter the main
results of the model. More importantly, the solution establishes that the amount of θ required to induce T2’s compliance
is greater than the amount of θ required to induce T1’s compliance. Therefore, the theoretical expectation that different
probabilities need to be assigned for detecting the behavior of both types of T is already accounted for in the solution of
the model.
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Equilibrium Results
The signaling game is solved by using Perfect Bayesian Solution Concept. This section presents the
main insights behind the solution and identifies the equilibria that are of particular interest. Formal
details are presented in Appendix A.
Under complete information on T’s type, S always prefers to make a deal with the sincere
target (T1) and keep sanctions in place against the opportunistic target (T2). However, senders lack
information on T’s type. The solution identifies the conditions under which targets can credibly
commit to a deal and senders end sanctions in this uncertain environment. I begin by considering T’s
choice between Comply and ∼ Comply and identify the amount of θ that guarantees compliance of
each type of T.
T1 is the sincere type that does not receive any positive utility from its offensive behavior, but this
does not guarantee its policy reversal. Since there is a chance that S will fail to verify T’s compliance
and keep sanctions in place despite T’s compliance, T1 requires assurances that its compliance
will be rewarded with sanctions relief. T1 makes policy concessions only if the sender’s ability to
verify compliance is sufficiently high. Formally, T1 complies if θ(x− ) + (1− θ)(−βT cT − ) >
θ(−βT cT − ) + (1− θ)(x− ), which simplifies to:
θ >
1
2
= θˆT1 (1)
T2, the opportunistic type, prefers to use sanctions relief to pursue its offensive behavior and
plays Comply only if the sender has a high likelihood of detecting and punishing its non-compliance.
Formally, S can induce T2’s compliance if:
θ >
1
2
+
1
2(βT cT + x)
= θˆT2 (2)
Both types of T require some level of θ in order to make policy concessions in exchange for sanctions
relief. However, the level of θ required to induce compliance is higher for the opportunistic type than
it is for the sincere type (θˆT2 > θˆT1). Opportunistic targets gain positive utility from the continuation
of their behavior; therefore, convincing them to reverse their policies requires the likelihood of
detection to be substantially higher. However, sincere targets do not gain any positive utility from
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their offensive behavior and therefore, their preferences are aligned with the sender. Under these
circumstances, sincere targets are willing to reverse their policies for a relatively lower value of θ.
Empirically, higher values of θ correspond to denser and more accurate information flow between
the sender and the target. On the contrary, lower values of θ indicate that there is a weaker information
flow between the rival states, and S has a low likelihood of accurately verifying T’s compliance
behavior. To ensure that the target will make policy concessions in exchange for sanctions relief, S
seeks to verify T’s compliance behavior and obtain reliable assurances that the deal’s terms will be
honored. However, not all senders are equally equipped to gather accurate compliance information
and the extent to which they will have access to information on T’s policies depends upon the density
of information flow between S and T. In the following subsections, I characterize the solution based
on three cases: low information flow between S and T (θ < θˆT1), moderate information flow between
S and T (θˆT1 < θ < θˆT2), and dense information flow between S and T (θ > θˆT2).
Case 1: Low Information Flow between S and T (θ < θˆT1)
When θ is low, S has very limited sources of information on the intentions and the behavior of T.
The discussion above establishes that under these circumstances, both T1 and T2 play ∼ Comply. T1
does not comply due to its worry about facing sanctions despite its compliance. T2 does not comply
to get away with its offensive behavior and reap the gains from sanctions relief. However, there are
still some cases in which the sender prefers end sanctions despite the expectation that T will keep
pursuing its offensive behavior. S plays Deal if the economic costs of sanctions, cS , is relatively high.
In these cases, S may prefer to end sanctions even against non-complying targets in order to avoid
causing further harm to its own economy.19
Case 2: Moderate Information Flow between S and T (θˆT1 < θ < θˆT2)
Even if cS is relatively lower in most cases and S can afford keeping sanctions in place, it still has
incentives to negotiate a sanctions removal deal. A successful deal not only reverses the inefficiencies
of economic sanctions accumulated over time, but also generates more wealth by resuming profitable
19Empirically, however, sanctions that generate major or severe costs to the sender are extremely rare (<1%) (Morgan,
Bapat and Krustev, 2009b). Therefore, I am substantively interested in cases where senders do not have strong economic
incentives to risk lifting sanctions against non-complying targets. In Appendix A, I present an additional test excluding
major/severe cost sanctions to the sender.
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economic interactions. To ensure that the target will make policy concessions in exchange for
sanctions relief, S seeks to verify target’s compliance behavior and obtain reliable assurances that the
deal’s terms will be honored.
Moderate levels of information flow between S and T are sufficiently high to induce T1’s
compliance, but not T2’s. Increasing the level of θ from low to moderate improves the sender’s ability
to accurately verify T’s behavior; however, it does not enable S to differentiate between T1 and T2.
On the contrary, moderate levels of information flow create incentives for T2 to misrepresent its true
type and mimic T1. In these cases, T2 participates in negotiations with no intention to make policy
concessions, and plays ∼ Comply. If opportunistic targets can successfully misrepresent their true
type, the outcome is characterized by S’s worst case outcome. However, the solution demonstrates
that senders can choose to remove sanctions despite the uncertainty about T’s intentions and the
opportunistic target’s incentives to misrepresent its true type.
First of all, as a - the additional costs S suffers for failing to catch T’s non-compliance- increases,
the probability of sanctions removal decreases. In other words, if the disputed issue is salient for S
and its citizens, and if the sender government is expected to be held accountable by its populace if
sanctions removal turns out to be a mistake, S becomes less likely to take the risk of ending sanctions
when the information flow between S and T is at moderate levels. Second, higher levels of cS ,
sanctions costs incurred by the sender, incentivize senders to end sanctions in order to avoid causing
further harm to its own economy.
In sum, there is still a chance of ending sanctions and resuming economic interactions in
equilibrium, even if the moderate levels of information do not allow S to accurately differentiate
between T1 and T2. Under these circumstances, having a high enough θ to provide assurances to
T1, and low enough θ to enable T2 to mimic T1 by participating in negotiations leads to sanctions
removal in equilibrium.
Case 3: Dense Information Flow between S and T (θ > θˆT2)
Lastly, I turn to cases where there is a dense information flow between S and T, which allows S to
detect T’s actual behavior with a higher probability. Under these circumstances both Ts play Comply,
but for different reasons. The availability of dense informational channels can provide assurances
to T1 that its compliance will be verified and rewarded. On the other hand, dense informational
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channels will induce T2’s compliance because of the expectation that its non-compliance will be
detected and punished. Knowing that both Ts will comply, S always prefers to make a deal over
ending sanctions.
Interestingly, however, S’s willingness to make a deal with T is not sufficient for economic
peace in equilibrium. Sanctions removal initially requires T to participate in negotiations. Therefore,
whether targets will Negotiate and open themselves up to scrutiny of senders when the likelihood
of accurate verification is high is the key question. For T to be willing to negotiate over its policies
when θ is high, the perceived benefit of resumed economic interactions must also be high. Otherwise,
T chooses to stay out of negotiations and sanctions persist. Formally, if θ is high (θ > θˆT2), T1 will
Negotiate only if:
x >
(1− θ)(βT cT ) + − cT
θ
= x∗T1 (3)
T2, on the other hand, will Negotiate only if :
x >
1 + (1− θ)(βT cT ) + − cT
θ
= x∗T2 (4)
Note that the amount of x that creates incentives for T2 to Negotiate is higher than the amount
of x required to convince T1 to Negotiate. If the value T places on resumed economic interactions
with S is low (x < x∗T1), both types of T will play ∼ Negotiate and quit the game at their first
node. Even if θ is high, T1 will not see the sanctions relief worthy of the risk of being faced with
harsher sanctions, no matter how small the risk is. T2, on the other hand, chooses not to participate
in negotiations in order to escape from the scrutiny of S, and being forced to comply. If the value
T places on resumed economic interactions with S is moderate (x∗T1 < x < x
∗
T2
), it will be high
enough to convince T1 to play Negotiate, but not high enough for T2 to be willing to participate in
negotiations and give up its offensive behavior. Therefore, a separating equilibrium forms where only
the sincere target participates in negotiations. For the cases where the value T places on resumed
economic interactions is high (x > x∗T2), both types of T will negotiate a deal with the sender and
make policy concessions in exchange for attractive sanctions relief.
In sum, the model reveals that dense information flow between S and T is necessary to solve
bargaining problems embedded in sanctions removal processes but not sufficient to facilitate sanctions
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removal. Dense information flow increases the likelihood of sanctions removal only if the efforts
are complemented with attractive economic inducements. If the proposed sanctions relief is not
attractive to the target, high levels of information flow between senders and targets can lead to the
persistence of inefficient sanctions by forcing the opportunistic types to stay out of negotiations with
the sender. This illustrates an interesting dynamic where increased information is necessary but not
sufficient to achieve economic peace.
Empirical Implications
The model generates interesting empirical implications about when sanctions end and economic
interactions resume. Sanctions removal is more likely if the sender is connected to the target
through dense institutional channels that facilitates information sharing. These channels can inform
senders about targets’ compliance behavior, thereby enabling senders to enforce sanctions removal
deals. Senders’ confidence that the targets’ non-compliance will be detected and punished facilitates
sanctions removal in two ways. First, it provides assurances to the sender, and second, it induces
target cooperation and discourages cheating.
Even if dense information flow between senders and targets mitigate bargaining problems
embedded in sanctions removal processes, it fails to guarantee sanctions removal. Dense information
flows can facilitate sanctions removal only if the increased likelihood of non-compliance detection
is complemented by attractive economic inducements. If the target does not place a high value on
sanctions relief and can offset the costs of sanctions through alternative means, targets will always
prefer to stay out of negotiations, knowing that the sender has a high likelihood of detecting and
punishing its behavior. In a case like North Korea, where the country’s revenue stream remains intact
due to assistance from and continued trade with third countries such as China, sanctions relief cannot
incentivize the leadership to come to the negotiating table. For sanctions to end, dense information
flow between senders and targets need to be complemented by a high value placed on sanctions relief
by targets, which requires sanctions to be able to hurt the target in the first place.
Hypothesis 1 (a): Dense information flows between senders and targets increase the probability
of sanctions removal, but only if the target places a high value on sanctions relief.
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Hypothesis 1 (b): Dense information flows between senders and targets decrease the probability
of sanctions removal in the absence of attractive sanctions relief.
Data and Research Design
I test my hypotheses with a sample of cases drawn from the Threats and Imposition of Economic
Sanctions (TIES) dataset for the years between 1946-2010 (Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi, 2014).20
Each observation in the TIES dataset corresponds to a sanctions episode with a sender, a target, a start
date, and an end date. I transform the dataset so that each observation is expanded into a series of
dyad-years for the duration of each sanctions episode, starting on the imposition year and ending on
the removal year. There are 232 unique security-related sanctions episodes with an average duration
of 5.7 years.21 The unit of analysis is directed-dyad-year, where the first actor is the sender and the
second actor is the target.
To better match the empirical analysis with my theoretical model, I build my dataset based on
the following criteria: First, if a sanctions episode has multiple senders, “primary sender” identified
in the TIES dataset, is coded as the sender. A primary sender is coded as the state that proposes
sanctions or is responsible for mobilizing other states to initiate sanctions. Therefore, primary senders
play a central role in the decision to keep or lift economic sanctions.22 If however, the sole target
or the sender was an intergovernmental organization, the cases are excluded. TIES Dataset records
only 8 security-related sanctions imposed primarily by an international organization and only 3
security-related sanctions imposed where the target is an international organization. This restriction
allows me to maintain the dyadic structure of the data where both the sender and the target countries
are identified in COW’s State System Membership Dataset, without significantly restricting my
sample. Second, I only analyze sanctions cases where the issue under contention is security-related.23
Sanctions imposed solely due to the target’s trade practices are potentially distinct and less severe
20TIES Datasets codes imposed sanctions between the years 1945-2005 and codes removal until 2013. Due to the
availability of data on my independent variables, my dataset covers the years 1946-2010.
21This indicates that cases such as the Cuban embargo and South African sanctions are relatively rare.
22However, I control for whether the sanctions were multilateral.
23Sanctions imposed for containing political influence and military behavior, destabilizing regime, demanding the release
of citizens or property, solving territorial disputes, denying strategic material, retaliating for alliance choices, demanding
human rights improvements, ending weapons proliferation, terminating support of non-state actors and punishing drug
trafficking are considered as security-related.
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(Peksen and Peterson, 2015; Drezner, 2003). Moreover, they are often limited in their ability to
harm the target’s economy as a whole and do not create the same degree of commitment problems
for targets. Lastly, I exclude the cases where sanctions are imposed and removed in the same year.
Analyzing these short-lived sanctions risks blurring the differentiation between the decision to lift
and the decision to impose sanctions. However, Appendix A provides robustness check results with
their inclusion.24
I also account for the cases with no end dates in the TIES dataset. For instance, the US imposed
sanctions on Albania in 1949 to terminate Albania’s support for non-state actors. The TIES dataset
does not code the end date of this episode, but provides information on the year of the last reported
incident (ongoing as of year), which is 1951. Assuming that the case is still ongoing and including
all dyad-years from 1949 to 2010 would be misleading. I address this problem using two alternative
coding decisions. First, I include all dyad-years between the imposition year and the year after the
“ongoing as of” year and code the end year as the year after the last recorded incident. For example,
in the US-Albania case, I include dyad-years of 1949, 1950, 1951 and 1952, and code the end year
as 1952. Second, instead of coding the year after the last recorded incident as the end year, I code
the case as ongoing. For the US-Albania case, I include dyad-years of 1949, 1950, 1951 and 1952,
and code the sanctions removal dependent variable as 0 for 1952. The results obtained using the
two different coding decisions are very similar. Below I present the findings obtained using this first
coding decision, and I present the results obtained using the second decision in Appendix A.25
The dependent variable is binary, capturing whether or not sanctions are lifted in a given year.
It is coded as 0 if sanctions are kept in place and 1 if they are lifted. The data has strings of 0s
for each sanctions episode, ending with a 1 at the year of sanctions removal. The instances of
sanctions removal accounts for 15% of the dataset. Since the dependent variable is binary, I use
probit regression.26 I cluster standard errors around the target state to control for potential non-
independence by targets. To account for the time dependence in the data, I use cubic polynomial
approximation (Carter and Signorino, 2010) by adding the duration of the dyads, its squared and
24There are 77 such cases in my sample, and with their inclusion, the results remain the same.
25I compute all robustness check results presented in Appendix A using both coding decisions separately.
26Appendix A presents the results from a rare events logistic regression, following King and Zeng (2001), to ensure that
the low frequency of 1s in the dependent variable is not driving the results.
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cubed term as regressors.27 Lastly, in addition to the probit model, I utilize a Cox proportional
hazards model, where the dependent variable is the count of years until sanctions end in a given
episode. Due to space restrictions and the relative ease of interpreting the effect of interaction terms
in probit models, I present the probit model’s results below and duration analysis results in Appendix
A.
Key Explanatory Variables
The two key factors that influence when sanctions end are the sender’s likelihood of verifying the
target’s behavior accurately (θ) and the value the target places on sanctions relief (x). I hypothesize
that sanctions are more likely to be lifted if there is dense information flow between the sender and
the target, but this relationship holds only if the target places a high value on sanctions relief.
I conceptualize θ as the extent to which the sender has formal and informal connections to the
target through joint institutions. The more countries interact with one another through institutions,
the denser the information flow between them becomes. To operationalize θ, I use a count of IGOs
that the sender and the target are jointly a member of in a given year, using COW’s International
Organizations Dataset (Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke, 2004). Joint IGO Membership ranges
from 0 to 72,28 with higher values representing denser informational flow between the sender and the
target, thus a higher likelihood of detecting targets’ behavior accurately.
I conceptualize x as the attractiveness of sanctions relief and I measure it by accounting for
the extent to which the target’s economy is harmed by sanctions in the first place. If the target can
maintain its profitable trade interactions while being under sanctions, the target is not expected to
value sanctions relief. On the contrary, if the target’s trade volume is shrinking under sanctions, the
value it places on sanctions relief is expected to be higher. To capture this dynamic, I created ∆ in
T’s Trade Volume variable by measuring the difference between the target’s total trade volume the
year prior to sanctions imposition and in any given year under sanctions, using COW’s Bilateral
Trade Dataset (v3.0) (Barbieri and Keshk, 2012). This variable ranges from -5 to 53 (in current
US 10 billion dollars); with negative values indicating targets’ trade losses under sanctions and
27The results obtained with cubic splines are presented in Appendix A (Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998).
28Histogram of the variable is presented in Appendix A.
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positive values indicating increases in trade volume despite sanctions.29 The literature establishes
how the target’s ability to adopt new trade partners (McLean and Whang, 2010), or engage in
sanctions-busting activities (Early, 2015) influence sanctions effectiveness; thereby influencing the
value targets place on sanctions relief. Therefore, instead of accounting for the change in bilateral
trade flows between the sender and the target, I account for the change in targets’ total trade flow
over time. To test my hypotheses, I interact Joint IGO Membership and ∆ in T’s Trade Volume, and
add both variables separately to the model as regressors.
A potential concern can arise if ∆ in T’s Trade Volume is picking up on global trends in trade
levels over time, instead of target-specific trade changes. This can be especially problematic for
long-lasting sanctions. Therefore, I create a new variable by standardizing ∆ in T’s Trade Volume
relative to the changes in yearly mean of global trade. I calculated the deviations of target’s trade
change from the mean of the global trade change in the same time period. Instead of measuring
the target’s trade volume changes relative to its own trade volume in the year prior to sanctions
imposition, the adjusted variable measures the difference between targets’ trade volume and the mean
of the global trade over the course of a sanctions episode, taking the value the year prior to sanctions
imposition as the baseline. The results obtained using this adjusted variable are very similar to the
results obtained using ∆ in T’s Trade Volume and are presented in Appendix A.
Control Variables
I further include several control variables that may explain sanctions removal. First, I include Multiple
Issues, which is coded as 1 if there are multiple issues under contention for a given episode, and 0 if
there is only one.30 Sanctions episodes involving multiple issues can be more contentious and harder
to end than episodes over a single issue. Similarly, I include Multiple Senders, which is coded as 1 if
TIES dataset records more than one sender for an episode, and 0 for unilateral episodes. Multilateral
sanctions is expected to be more persistent than unilateral sanctions since the removal decision often
requires consensus among senders.
29As expected, the frequency of targets whose economy grows significantly under sanctions is low. See Appendix A for
robustness checks to ensure that the results are not driven by the distribution of this variable.
30Around 31% of the unique sanctions episodes in the dataset have multiple issues under contention.
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I also account for the target’s trade dependence to the sender, using the following formula for the
year prior to sanctions imposition: (T’s exports to S + T’s imports from S) / (T’s exports + imports)
(Barbieri and Keshk, 2012). Trade Dependence is a continuous variable between 0 and 1 that captures
the ratio of the target’s trade volume with the sender to its total trade volume prior to sanctions
imposition. Lower levels of trade dependence is indicative of the target’s ability to find alternate
trading partners while under sanctions. Therefore, higher levels of trade dependence to the sender is
expected to facilitate sanctions removal.
Fourth, I add GDP Ratio (per capita), capturing the relative economic power within the sender-
target dyad, taken from Gleditsch (2002). Lastly, I include a measure of foreign policy similarity
between the sender and the target, using S-scores, assembled from UN General Assembly votes
(Voeten, Strezhnev and Bailey, 2009). The variable ranges from -1 to 1, where higher values indicate
more similar interests. Joint IGO membership can indicate political preference proximity between
senders and targets, and the inclusion of the Foreign Policy Similarity variable allows me to ensure
that the results are not driven by the reasons why countries might join the same set of IGOs in the
first place.
Results
Model 1 in Table 2 reports the results of the baseline model capturing the effect of the interaction
term on the probability of sanctions removal. Model 2 presents the full model, including all
of the explanatory and control variables. The theoretical model predicts that the probability of
sanctions removal is higher if there is a denser information flow between senders and targets, and
this relationship holds only if the value the target places on sanctions relief is high. The coefficient
of Joint IGO Membership is positive and statistically significant in both models, indicating that the
probability of sanctions removal is higher in cases with denser sender-target connectivity through
institutional channels. The coefficient on the interaction term is negative and statistically significant,
which indicates the decreasing effect of joint IGO membership on the probability of sanctions
removal as the target’s trade volume increases under sanctions.
While the results presented in Table 2 are informative, they are limited in their ability to portray
the substantive effects of joint IGO membership on the probability of sanctions removal for the
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Table 2: Probit: Sanctions Removal
M1: Baseline M2: Full Model
Joint IGO Membership 0.015** 0.021***
(0.00) (0.01)
∆ in T’s Trade Volume 0.125*** 0.138***
(0.03) (0.04)
Joint IGO Membership x ∆ in T’s Trade Volume -0.002* -0.003**
(0.00) (0.00)
Trade Dependence -0.750*
(0.37)
Multiple Issues -0.231*
(0.11)
Multiple Senders -0.005
(0.12)
Foreign Policy Similarity 0.180
(0.13)
GDP Ratio (per capita) 0.196
(0.35)
Constant -1.761*** -2.109***
(0.20) (0.56)
N 1083 795
Log L -413.5 -308.9
- Estimates are derived from a probit model with robust s.e. clustered on the target state (in parenthesis).
- Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
- Temporal controls are omitted. (The full results are presented in Appendix A.)
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relevant values of ∆ in T’s Trade Volume. To interpret the results visually, Figure 4 presents the
marginal effects of Joint IGO Membership across the observed range of ∆ in T’s Trade Volume. The
x-axis represents the observed range of the change in target’s trade volume, in current US 10 billions
of dollars. The variable captures the difference between the target’s total trade volume in a given
year under sanctions and the year before sanctions imposition. Negative values correspond to cases
where targets experienced trade losses under sanctions, and positive values correspond to cases where
targets increased their trade volume, despite being under sanctions.
The solid dashed line shows how the marginal effect of Joint IGO Membership changes as the
∆ in T’s Trade Volume increases. The 95% confidence intervals drawn around this line determine
whether this effect is significant. The rug plot above the x-axis portrays the frequency distribution of
the ∆ in T’s Trade Volume variable. The cases in which targets’ trade volume grows significantly
under sanctions are not very common; however, the results are still substantively meaningful. There
are 68 dyad-years in which target’s trade volume change is greater than 5, which accounts for 4.6%
of the dataset. I address the implications of this and present robustness check analysis in Appendix
A.
Figure 4: Marginal Effects of Joint IGO Membership on the Probability of Sanctions Removal
The effect of joint IGO membership is significant for all the values of trade volume change
where the upper and the lower bounds of the confidence interval are both below or above the zero
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line. The plot indicates that, if the target’s total trade is shrinking under sanctions, higher levels of
information flow between the sender and the target significantly increases the probability of sanctions
removal. The results also hold if the target’s total trade remains the same or is only minimally higher
than the year before sanctions imposition. Substantively, this demonstrates that joint institutional
membership and the information that is available to senders through these institutional channels
facilitate sanctions removal, but only if the value the target places on resumed interactions with the
sender is high. In other words, dense information flow between the rival states can increase the
likelihood of sanctions removal if sanctions were able to harm the target’s trade levels initially.
If, however, the target’s trade volume grows in spite of sanctions, the direction of the effect
changes, and the joint IGO membership variable starts to have a statistically significant reductive
effect on the probability of sanctions removal. This confirms Hypothesis 1(b). Targets that can offset
the costs of sanctions through alternate trade partners do not place a high value on the proposed
sanctions relief. Under these circumstances, they are discouraged from entering into negotiations
with senders. Interestingly, high levels of information flow between senders and targets can lead to
the persistence of economic sanctions, if the efforts are not complemented by attractive sanctions
relief.
The results also reveal other interesting insights. The negative and statistically significant
coefficient of Trade Dependence is against my initial expectations. The results show that targets’ high
levels of trade dependence to the sender decreases the likelihood of sanctions removal. Sanctions are
initially imposed when targets stand firm against senders’ demands. If targets choose to stand firm
despite their high levels of trade dependencies on the sender, they are more likely to be resolute and
their foreign challenges are more likely to be salient. Under these circumstances, those sanctions
episodes might be persistent. The model also shows that the coefficient for Multiple Issues is negative
and statistically significant, indicating that episodes that are imposed due to multiple different policies
of the target are harder to end. However, the same effect does not exist for the cases where there
are multiple senders. I expected to see that sanctions episodes are less likely to be lifted if the
removal decision requires an agreement among multiple participating senders. Even if the sign of the
relationship is in the expected direction, the results show that multilateral sanctions are not harder to
end than unilateral sanctions.
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Conclusion
Sanctions onset and when such coercive efforts can induce target concessions have received ample
scholarly attention. However, the questions of how sanction effectiveness is achieved and how
rival states can transition from a state of economic conflict to a state of economic peace are often
blackboxed in existing theories. By shifting the theoretical focus to the negotiations between senders
and targets over ending sanctions, I identify the key challenges that prevent rival states from achieving
economic peace and the conditions under which increased information can help them overcome these
challenges.
This chapter argues that commitment problems faced by targets, coupled with the sender’s
uncertainty about how the target will behave once sanctions are lifted, are the key challenges to
ending sanctions. I argue that senders and targets can achieve economic peace under two conditions:
when targets can credibly signal their willingness to alter their behavior in exchange for sanctions
relief and when senders have reliable assurances that the deal’s terms will be honored and any target
deviation will be detected. I examine the role of IGOs as facilitators of information provision in
sanctions removal processes. The theoretical model and the empirical findings demonstrate that
sanctions are more likely to be lifted if senders can gather accurate information on targets’ behavior
through institutional channels, which then enables the enforcement of sanctions removal deals. The
results suggest that senders need to keep the diplomatic and institutional channels open with the
target state even when the relations are tense and sanctions are in place.
I show how information and commitment problems complement one another and solving
information problems is a prerequisite of solving commitment problems. Such information flows
provide assurances to the sender, minimize the risks associated with strengthening the target with
sanctions relief, and allow targets to certify their willingness to cooperate, once they make a deal.
Moreover, I show that, for this mechanism to work, senders should be able to complement their
efforts by attractive sanctions relief. This requires senders to be able to harm the targets’ economy in
the first place as a way to gain leverage during sanctions removal negotiations. If targets do not place
a high value on the proposed sanctions relief, they will not have an incentive to open themselves up
to the scrutiny of senders, and might choose to stay out of negotiations over ending sanctions.
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CHAPTER 3: WHEN DO SANCTION RECUR?
The year 2016 was marked by the removal of decades long sanctions against Cuba, Iran, and
Myanmar. These reconciliations have been years in the making and products of lengthy and thorough
negotiations. However, in 2017, only a year after their removal, and shortly after the inauguration of
President Trump, we have witnessed new sanctions against these three countries. In October 2017,
President Trump announced his decision to de-certify the Iranian nuclear deal. In addition to the
threat of new nuclear sanctions, he also announced the imposition of new terrorism related sanctions
on Iran. A month later, the U.S. government restricted travel to Cuba, expelled 15 Cuban diplomats,
and imposed sanctions targeting individuals and entities in Myanmar that are believed to be affiliated
with the military operation against the Rohingya people.
The sudden foreign policy shifts in these three high-profile sanctions cases raise the question:
Why do economic sanctions recur? One explanation can be the concerns about the target’s behavior
in the post-sanctions period. Senders can initiate new sanctions if the target pursues an offensive
behavior following sanctions removal. President Obama’s efforts to normalize relations with Cuba,
Iran, and Myanmar partially depend on the expectation that these countries would respond positively
to diplomacy with time. However, since the removal of sanctions, the Castro government has failed
to implement any democratic reforms. The Iranian government is reported to be in compliance with
the restrictions on their nuclear activities by the IAEA; however, they have pursued confrontation
with the U.S. in other areas, such as developing ballistic missiles and sponsoring terrorism. And
the Burmese military, with little resistance from the nations’ democratically elected leader who
was instrumental in Obama’s decision to lift sanctions, have engaged in what UN officials have
condemned as ethnic cleansing against the Muslim Rohingya minority group in the country.31
Alternatively, senders’ decision to initiate new sanctions can be motivated by their domestic
politics, instead of being a reaction to the target’s behavior. The recent instances of sanctions
31Cumming-Bruce, Nick. “Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar Is Ethnic Cleansing, U.N. Rights Chief Says” (2017, Septem-
ber 11), The New York Times. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/11/world/asia/
myanmar-rohingya-ethnic-cleansing.html
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recurrences by the U.S. can also be seen as efforts by President Trump to dismantle President
Obama’s achievements and legacy in international affairs and to differentiate his foreign policy
agenda from his predecessor. In fact, Ben Rhodes, Obama’s former deputy national security adviser,
stated that “the organizing principle for how President Trump approaches foreign policy appears to
be, in part, trying to look like he’s doing the opposite of his predecessor.”
In this chapter, I present two plausible explanations for when sanctions recur. First, I develop a
strategic argument, which states that sanctions recur due to concerns about the target’s behavior in the
post-sanctions period. The alternative explanation is that sanctions re-occurrence is motivated by the
domestic politics of the sender country. After testing these two competing hypotheses, I find support
for the domestic politics explanation. I show that targets’ behavior in the post-sanctions period is not
a significant determinant of whether sanctions recur. Instead, sanctions are more likely to recur if the
leader changes in the sender country and a different societal coalition becomes influential. I argue
that the leaders that end sanctions are prone to facing domestic costs if they renew sanctions; while
new leaders, especially the ones that represent a different societal base are immune to these costs.
On the contrary, sanctions recurrence can provide them with opportunities for political gain.
Analyzing the Aftermath of Sanctions Removal
Despite the growing body of literature on economic sanctions and the increasing use of economic
coercion as a foreign policy tool, our understanding on the sanctioning process is limited to the
time period in which sanctions are in place and the scholarly interest in economic sanctions often
dissipates with their termination. The research on economic sanctions has extensively focused on
the question of when economic sanctions end (Krustev and Morgan, 2011; Dorussen and Mo, 2001;
Bolks and Al-Sowayel, 2000) and succeed in achieving their intended goals (Dizaji and Bergeijk,
2013; Bapat and Morgan, 2009; Peksen and Peterson, 2015; Allen, 2005; Cortright and Lopez, 2002;
Dashti-Gibson, Davis and Radcliff, 2007; Early, 2015; McLean and Whang, 2010). However, even
in the cases that end with target acquiescence and sender success, sanctions removal does not always
lead to continued economic and financial transactions in the long-run. The Threat and Imposition
of Sanctions (TIES) Dataset (Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi, 2014) identifies 358 security-related
sanctions imposed and lifted between 1945-2013. As illustrated in Figure 5, in 37 percent of those
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cases, senders threaten their targets with new sanctions or impose new sanctions on them in the ten
years following sanctions removal. In those recurred cases, the initial sanctions removal does not
mark the end of the sanctioning activity between senders and targets. It only provides an opportunity
for senders and targets to resume their profitable financial and economic transactions temporarily.
Every renewed sanctions episode identified in Figure 5 is also an instance of sanctions onset.
Most scholarly work that identifies when senders employ threat and imposition of economic sanctions
typically investigates instances of sanctions onset within the same dyad as unrelated, isolated
processes (Lektzian and Souva, 2003; Smith, 1996). However, analyzing recurred sanctions as
independent instances of sanctions onset, and not accounting for how the consequences of the
decision to end initial sanctions influence the sender-target relations in the post-sanctions period
would be misleading. Senders and targets continue to interact following sanctions removal and
sanctions-level characteristics continue to influence their relations after sanctions end. Targets’
decisions about their foreign policy choices in the post-sanctions period, as well as senders’ decisions
to initiate new sanctions are made in the shadow of the characteristics of the initial sanctions, their
termination, and the consequences of the lifting of sanctions. Therefore, answering the question of
when sanctions recur necessitates examining the consequences of the decision to end sanctions in the
first place.
Figure 5: Sanctions Recurrence Over Time
Note: This figure shows the frequency of sanctions recurrence of the security-related sanctions imposed between 1945-2005.
The height of the bars show the number of sanctions imposed in a given year. The black bars show the number of imposed
sanctions that have recurred in 10 years following their removal, and the light gray bars show the number of imposed
sanctions that have not recurred.
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Ending sanctions have economic and domestic consequences in varying degrees in both the
sender and the target country. One of the main consequences of sanctions removal is the resumption
of profitable economic and financial transactions between the sender and the target. Sanctions are
designed to harm the target country’s economy, either directly by freezing or limiting economic and
financial transactions, or indirectly by creating market imperfections through fines on individuals and
businesses, travel bans or increased uncertainty about the economic stability of the targeted country.
Theoretically, the accumulation of these direct and indirect costs are expected to inhibit the target’s
ability to pursue its offensive behavior (Dorussen and Mo, 2001) and force the target to make policy
concessions (Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi, 2014; Hufbauer et al., 2007). Removing sanctions,
on the other hand, resumes profitable economic and financial transactions and reverses the market
imperfections, thereby strengthening the target’s economy. Sanctions termination and the subsequent
provision of sanctions relief often generate economic gains for the targeted country in the form of
increased trade revenues, repatriation of assets frozen abroad, the ease of financial transactions, and
an increased flow of investment or foreign aid.
Targets’ access to sanctions relief has two complementary implications for sender-target relations
in the post-sanctions period. First, a stronger economy contributes to the target’s future bargaining
power (Fearon, 1996; Chadefaux, 2011; McCormack and Pascoe, 2015) and makes the target more
resilient to economic pressure. If the sender chooses to use economic sanctions as a coercive strategy
in the future, it will now be facing a wealthier target with a stronger negotiating position, and a target
that is more capable of offsetting the costs of new sanctions. In other words, sanctions removal might
hinder the effectiveness of the next round of sanctions; thus influences the assessment of senders
about sanctions recurrence.
Second, having a stronger economy might create incentives for the target to channel the gains
obtained through sanctions relief into its foreign policy challenges that initially triggered sanctions,
or adopt new policies that might be offensive to the sender. For instance, Iran is currently enjoying
significant boost in its oil revenue, foreign investment, and access to previously frozen assets. This
raises concerns about its ability to credibly commit not to pursue its nuclear ambitions. Moreover,
there are increased concerns about the country’s sponsoring of terrorism using the gains from
sanctions relief. In fact, in October 2017, the U.S. has formally added Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corp (IRGC) to its anti-terrorism sanctions list, stating that the group had been designated
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for providing support to a number of terrorist organizations, including Hezbullah and Hamas, and the
Taliban.32
Overall, sanctions relief can provide the target with opportunities to challenge the status quo in
the post-sanctions period. As the target state gets wealthier with sanctions relief, it may not be able
to credibly commit not to take advantage of sanctions removal and exploit the greater bargaining
leverage it has (Powell, 2004, 2006). Commitment problems can be more acute in cases where
sanctions removal deals are difficult to enforce and the target’s behavior is hard to detect (Fearon,
1998; Schultz, 2010). In sum, once senders end economic sanctions, they might lose leverage over
targets and their policy choices.
Sanctions removal and the subsequent resumption of economic and financial interactions generate
additional wealth for the sender country as well. Once sanctions are lifted, and it becomes legal to
invest in or conduct business with previously targeted countries, and once the relationship between
the sender and the target starts normalizing, new lucrative economic opportunities arise for senders
and their companies. However, the public choice approach and the rent-seeking literature establish
that these consequences are likely to be felt disproportionately across domestic groups (Eyler, 2007;
Lektzian and Patterson, 2015). Economic sanctions create winners and losers in the domestic
economy, and divide special interest groups and voters along the pro-sanctions/anti-sanctions line
(Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1992). The market distortions produced by sanctions, especially trade
sanctions, are similar to distortions produced by protectionism (Selden, 1999; Pond, 2017). They
create rents for domestic producers by raising the prices of importable goods above the world price
(Dorussen and Mo, 2001). On the contrary, they cause export-oriented producers lose access to
foreign markets. Sanctions removal reverses these distributional effects and creates a new set of
winners and losers in the sender’s domestic economy. Therefore, special interests groups that used
to enjoy net benefits from sanctions might pressure the government for the renewal of economic
sanctions; whereas, special interest groups that experienced economic losses under sanctions will
be satisfied with the removal decision and oppose any new sanctions on the target country. This
new domestic environment is expected to factor into senders’ sanctions policies following sanctions
removal.
32U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Center.“Treasury Designates the IRGC under Terrorism Authority.”, 13
October 2017, Retrieved from: https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0177.aspx.
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How do these economic and domestic consequences of sanctions removal affect the likelihood
of sanctions recurrence? Do senders act strategically and renew sanctions in response to target
recidivism in the aftermath of sanctions removal, or is the recurrence decision mainly influenced by
the domestic politics of the sender country? In the following sections, I expand on both explanations
and formulate two competing hypotheses about when sanctions recur.
A Strategic Analysis of Sanctions Recurrence
A considerable amount of the literature on economic sanctions has used the bargaining framework by
conceptualizing sanctions episodes as instances of strategic interaction between senders and targets
(Drezner, 1999; Lacy and Niou, 2004; Krustev, 2010; Morgan and Schwebach, 1997; Bapat and
Kwon, 2015; Cortright and Lopez, 2002). The research presented in these studies often defines
economic sanctions as a coercive foreign policy tool designed to induce a targeted country to change
some of its policies it would not otherwise, in a way favorable to the sender (Baldwin, 1985; Hufbauer
et al., 2007; Morgan, Bapat and Krustev, 2009a). In theory, sanctions achieve this by imposing
economic costs on the targeted country, and demanding policy change in exchange for sanctions
relief. The promise of resuming profitable economic interactions or reversing market imperfections
are expected to serve as a credible bargaining leverage for senders to induce target cooperation.
The implicit assumption made by all of these studies is that the driver of the sender’s decision is
the target’s behavior and the goal of the sanctioning behavior is to convince the target to make
policy concessions. Economic sanctions aim to affect the target’s cost/benefit analysis and alter its
assessment about the feasibility of its offensive behavior by increasing the costs of it.
According to the bargaining framework, once sanctions are removed, there is often an implicit
expectation that sanctions will be renewed in case of a non-compliance. Targets’ non-compliance can
either be in the form of recidivism, pursuing the offensive behavior that initially triggered sanctions,
or in the form pursuing a new offensive behavior using the gains from sanctions relief. Either way,
senders are expected to call on this behavior by threatening them with new sanctions, or punish
them with potentially harsher sanctions. This is especially true if the initial sanctions ended with
partial or full target capitulation or a negotiated settlement. If the sender fails to punish the target’s
offensive behavior in the post-sanctions period, this can have negative implications on the credibility
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of the sender in future sanctions removal negotiations. The sender’s reaction to the target’s behavior
following sanctions removal allows targets to differentiate between resolved and unresolved senders.
Therefore, senders always have an incentive to monitor the target’s behavior and enforce sanctions
removal deals. Assuming that the causal mechanisms for sanctions onset identified by the literature
using the bargaining framework is applicable to the context of sanctions recurrence, I formulate the
following hypothesis:
H1: Senders are more likely to initiate new sanctions episodes if the target engages in an
offensive behavior in the aftermath of sanctions removal.
Domestic Politics of Sanctions Recurrence
Hypothesis 1 argues that senders’ decision to renew sanctions is a strategic reaction to the target’s
behavior in the post-sanctions period and the goal of renewing sanctions is to punish the target’s
offensive behavior in an effort to convince the target to comply. However, the initial decision to end
sanctions and the domestic consequences of this decision can also influence senders’ decisions about
whether to renew sanctions. First, targets’ offensive behavior might not trigger new sanctions if the
domestic costs of this foreign policy decision is high. Second, the sender’s leadership might expect
to receive domestic gains from sanctions recurrence. If this is the case, we can observe new sanctions
even if the target is not definitively pursuing an offensive behavior. Therefore, sanctions recurrence
can also be conceptualized as a decision made by the leadership of the sender country weighing these
domestic costs and benefits, instead of being a strategic reaction to the policies adopted by the target
following sanctions removal.
Leaders are often constrained by the preferences of domestic actors. They are driven by the
desire to remain in office or in power and they have incentives to earn or increase the support of their
winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005; Huth, 1996). To this end, they pursue policies,
including foreign policies, in the best interest of the particular societal coalition that keeps them in
power. Following this logic, we can argue that the initial decision to end sanctions was influenced by
the special interests groups that were harmed by the existing sanctions regime and their lobbying
efforts. Once sanctions end, the winners of the sanctions regime lose their economic advantage
generated by sanctions and groups that incurred net costs due to the sanctions regime reverse these
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costs. If the leader who initially made the decision to remove sanctions is still in power, she will
be constrained by the same set of societal interests that favored sanctions removal. In these cases,
sender’s hands might be tied and sanctions recurrence can be domestically costly, even in the face of
target recidivism.
Leaders are not only constrained by special interests groups, but also by public opinion at large.
Leaders view approval as an asset and disapproval as a political cost (Edwards, 1997). Therefore,
when they make decisions about whether to initiate new sanctions, they account for the potential
reaction of the public to this decision. If the leader initiates new sanctions against the target in the
post-sanctions period, she inevitably signals foreign policy inconsistency and admits that the initial
decision to end sanctions was a mistake. The public often perceives foreign policy inconsistency as
evidence of incompetence (Tomz, 2007). Such signals can trigger disapproval, even by those who
originally opposed sanctions removal (Hermann, 1990). Therefore, senders might choose not to
re-initiate sanctions in the aftermath of sanctions removal, even if the target pursues an offensive
behavior. In these cases, avoiding blame and ensuring foreign policy consistency can be prioritized
by the leader over taking a chance at altering the target’s offensive behavior.
The public’s evaluation of foreign policy is an integral part of their overall performance assess-
ment of their leaders (Nincic and Hinckley, 1991). It has been suggested that for this link to exist, the
public needs to be informed about foreign policy. Special interest groups do have a strong incentive
to pay attention to sanctions policies and its distributional effects. And in the case of the larger public,
Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida (1989), and more recently, Kertzer and Zeitzoff (2017) show that even
if the public lacks information, they can still rely on their predispositions and principles in forming
attitudes towards specific foreign policy issues. A common attitude Tomz (2007) identifies is a
dislike for inconsistency. Even if the public may not be informed about the details of the sanctioning
decisions, they will consider inconsistency as a sign of weakness. Therefore, this creates incentives
for leaders to factor “foreign policy consistency” into their sanctions recurrence decisions.
However, these two domestic political costs of sanctions recurrence, alienating the special
interests groups that are salient for the leadership, and signaling foreign policy inconsistency, are
only applicable to the leaders who initially terminated sanctions, or the new leaders that represent
the same societal base or political party. Leaders who did not invest their own political capital to
the decision to end sanctions can easily overcome these challenges. This is especially true if the
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new leader represents a new societal base, whose preferences are different from the groups that
her predecessor was drawing support from. On the contrary, they can expect political gains from
sanctions recurrence.
The bargaining framework, as well as Hypothesis 1, assume that “the sender finds sanctions
useful only for their potential impact on the target’s policies” (Krustev and Morgan, 2011), and
sanctions are an outcome of strategic interaction between senders and targets. However, altering the
target’s behavior may not be the only objective of senders when they formulate policies regarding
sanctions recurrence. Senders also have domestic objectives, such as increasing popular support,
appealing to certain special interest groups, thwarting internal criticism, avoiding foreign policy
inconsistency or signaling strength and decisiveness (Whang, 2011; McLean and Whang, 2014).
In the case of sanctions recurrence, sanctions can have utility even if they do not alter the target’s
behavior (Lindsay, 1986), and moreover, even if the target is not pursuing a foreign policy that
needs to be altered. First, the new leaders that represent a new societal base can expect to gain
political benefits by appealing to the societal interests groups that initially opposed sanctions removal.
Second, sanctions recurrence can serve as a tool for new leaders to differentiate themselves, and their
foreign policies, from their predecessors’ (Hermann, 1990). In sum, new leaders do not only isolate
themselves from the potential domestic costs of sanctions recurrence that their predecessors would
face, but also expect domestic gains from it. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
H2 - Senders are more likely to initiate new sanctions episodes against targets if senders’
domestic sources of leader support change.
A closer look at the Iranian sanctions, one of the three high-profile sanctions the U.S. has ended
in 2016 and renewed in 2017, illustrates both hypotheses. President Trump announced his willingness
to de-certify the Iranian nuclear deal, and on the same day, he also announced the imposition of new
terrorism related sanctions on Iran. Why did President Trump re-consider his predecessor’s decision
to end sanctions on Iran? Hypothesis 1 and 2 offer competing explanations to this question.
According to Hypothesis 1, senders can initiate new sanctions if the target channels the gains
from sanctions relief into the policy that initially triggered sanctions, or into another policy that is
offensive to the sender. President Trump might be concerned about the Iranian compliance with
the nuclear deal. Despite the reports published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
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attesting to the Iranian compliance,33 he has stated in numerous occasions that “Iran has committed
multiple violations of the agreement.” Similarly, he might be concerned about the implications of a
stronger Iran and the regime’s future foreign policy choices.
The discussion leading up to Hypothesis 2 establishes how the hands of the leaders who end
sanctions might be tied in the post-sanctions period; however, new leaders are often immune to
the domestic costs of sanctions recurrence. On the contrary, they might expect political gains
from sanctions recurrence. President Trump might be expecting political gains from reviving the
Iranian sanctions debate. Withdrawing from the nuclear accord was one his main foreign policy
campaign promises and he has frequently criticized President Obama and his administration for
signing “one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into.”
Renewing sanctions on Iran can potentially receive the support of the Republicans and the special
interest groups that initially opposed the nuclear deal. According to the Pew Research Center’s
polling conducted in mid-July 2015, shortly after President Obama announced the deal, only 6% of
Republican respondents indicated support for the deal and 75% of Republican respondents indicated
that the ability of the U.S. and international agencies to monitor Iran’s compliance is either “not too
much” or “none at all”.34 This suggests that President Trump’s decision to renew sanctions on Iran
can appeal to his political base.
Data and Research Design
To test these two competing hypotheses and determine which factors influence senders’ decision to
re-initiate economic sanctions and which do not, I primarily use sanctions data from the Threats and
Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) dataset (Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi, 2014). The TIES Dataset
contains information on sanctions episodes initiated between 1945 and 2005 and each episode’s
start and end dates, along with many other sanctions-level characteristics. I create a time-series
cross-sectional dataset where sanctions episodes enter into the dataset once they have been lifted.
33“IAEA confirms Iran is meeting its commitments under nuclear agreement” (2017, November 13), The
Washington Post. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
iaea-confirms-iran-is-meeting-its-commitments-under-nuclear-deal/2017/11/13/
8d9b9fb0-c893-11e7-b0cf-7689a9f2d84e_story.html?utm_term=.897abcec489a
34For the full report, see: http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2015/
09/09-8-2015-Iran-release.pdf
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When a sanctions episode ends, the sender-target dyad enters an economic peace spell during which
it is at risk of relapsing into a renewed sanctions episode. To capture this economic peace spell, I
create 10 post-sanctions years for each episode and identify whether sanctions recur or not in these
years. I observe dyads until a new sanctions episode is initiated by the sender against the same target
or until the end of the tenth post-sanctions year, in which case the dyad is right-censored. The unit
of analysis is dyad-year for the aftermath of each security related sanctions episode and the dataset
covers the years between 1947-2012.35
As an illustration of how I create the dataset, a closer look at a few sanctions episodes can be
helpful. For instance, the U.S. imposed sanctions on Pakistan in 1965 to contain Pakistan’s military
aggression in the region. Sanctions were lifted in 1975, and the US-Pakistan dyad enters into the
dataset in the year 1976. The U.S. initiates a new sanctions episode against Pakistan to destabilize
the regime and improve its human rights in 1977; therefore, US-Pakistan dyad is observed for the
years of 1976 and 1977. To look at the right-censored dyads, let me examine US-Poland sanctions.
The U.S. imposed sanctions on Poland in 1980. Sanctions were lifted in 1984, and the US-Poland
dyad enters into the dataset for the years between 1985 and 1994, as there were no recorded sanctions
episode initiated by the U.S. against Poland in the 10-year period after the termination of initial
sanctions.
If the initial sanctions episode has multiple senders, or was initiated by an international organiza-
tion, I maintain the dyadic structure of the data, where the first country is the “primary sender” and
the second country is the target state. The TIES Dataset codes a “primary sender” as the state that
proposes sanctions or is responsible for mobilizing other states to initiate sanctions. For instance,
the U.S.-Poland case referenced above was initiated primarily by the United States in partnership
with France, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Germany; however, the TIES dataset identifies
the “primary sender” as the United States. Therefore, I observe the aftermath of sanctions for the
US-Poland dyad.
35The datasets starts in 1947, because the earliest sanctions removal date recored by the TIES dataset is 1946. The latest
end year recorded is 2011, and for those cases, the hypothetical 10-year window goes until 2021. The latest post-sanctions
year covered is 2012, due to availability of data for independent variables.
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Lastly, I only analyze the aftermath of security-related sanctions36 for two reasons: First, trade-
related sanctions are imposed due to the target’s trade practices or economic policies and tend to be
less severe. They often target a specific economic sector and do not harm the target’s economy as a
whole (Peksen and Peterson, 2015; Drezner, 2003). Therefore, their removal does not create the same
degree of commitment problems as security-related sanctions. Similarly, sanctions relief is typically
enjoyed by the specific sector that was initially targeted, not by the target government. Second,
trade-related sanctions are often initiated by bureaucratic branches, such as the Treasury/Commerce
departments or agencies like the Office of Foreign Assets Control in the United States. Sanctions
decisions made by these agencies do not frequently receive public attention or media coverage. On
the contrary, security-related sanctions tend to have a higher visibility and generate significant public
awareness, which in return constrains the leadership of the sender (Baum and Potter, 2008).
In creating my dataset, I also account for sanctions episodes with no recorded end dates in the
TIES Dataset. There are 26 such cases in my dataset and dropping them out of the analysis would
result in a loss of valuable information.37 Therefore, I use the information on the year of the last
reported incident provided by TIES. The variable named ongoing as of year identifies the last year
in which the data collectors were able to obtain information on the case and no further information
about the case was found. I treat the year after the ongoing as of year as the end year and construct
post-sanction years for the years following that end date. For instance, the U.S. imposed sanctions
on Ireland in 1952 due to Ireland’s alignment choices and the TIES dataset records the ongoing as of
year as 1986. Assuming that the episode was still ongoing in 2012 will be misleading. Therefore, I
code the end-year of the episode as 1987 and include observations for the U.S.-Ireland dyad for the
years between 1988 and 1997.
Overall, the final dataset consists of 2722 observations, accounting for post-sanctions years of
358 unique security-related economic sanctions imposed between 1945 and 2005 and the observations
cover the years between 1947 and 2012.
36Containing political influence and military behavior, destabilizing regimes, demanding the release of citizens or
property, solving territorial disputes, denying strategic material, retaliating for alliance choices, demanding human rights
improvements, ending weapons proliferation, terminating support of non-state actors and punishing drug trafficking are
considered as security-related goals.
37I also estimate the main model by dropping those 26 cases. The results remain the same and they are presented in
Appendix B.
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Dependent Variable
I code Sanctions Recurrence as a binary variable capturing the onset of a new sanctions episode
involving the same sender and the target. A new episode can be initiated either by a threat or an
imposition of economic sanctions. Treating threats as instances of sanctions recurrence is in line
with the causal mechanisms of the two competing theories I test. The bargaining theory establishes
the importance of sanction threats and shows that effective sanctions are the ones that convince the
target to alter its policy at the threat stage (Smith, 1996; Lacy and Niou, 2004). If senders want to
alter the target’s behavior in the post-sanctions period, threats can be a cost-effective coercive policy.
Moreover, threats can be instrumental for domestic purposes even if it is not followed through.
I also allow the issue under contention for the renewed sanctions to be different than the issue
under contention for the initial sanctions. Once sanctions are lifted and the target starts enjoying the
gains from sanctions relief, it will have the opportunity and resources to pursue an offensive behavior
that may not necessarily be the same as the behavior that led to sanctions initially. For instance, the
U.S. imposed new sanctions on Iran in October 2017 due to Iran’s support for terrorism and the new
sanctions can still be conceptualized as a continuation of the nuclear-related sanctions that ended in
2016. In fact, in some cases, targets can be incentivized not to pursue the offensive behavior that
initially triggered sanctions due to increased scrutiny over that behavior, especially in the short-run.
However, they may choose to pursue a different offensive behavior in the hopes that they will get
away with it.
The TIES dataset codes instances of threats and imposition of economic sanctions between the
years 1945-2005. Therefore, I cannot use the TIES Dataset to identify sanctions recurrence for the
years after 2005. For that reason, I gather new data on sanction threats and impositions between
the years 2005 and 2012. To collect this information, I primarily consult Lexis Nexis, a database
of electronic news drawn from the archives of over 10,000 press agencies and newspapers. I also
consult government reports, United Nations resolutions, European Union documentation, and the
GIGA Sanctions Dataset that codes sanctions imposed by the UN, US and EU in the period from
1990 to 2010 (Portela and von Soest, 2012). In identifying threats and impositions, I strictly follow
the coding rules of the TIES dataset to ensure consistency.38
38A list of the newly coded episodes and their short summaries can be found in Appendix B.
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Sanctions Recurrence is coded as 0 for each year of economic peace in the post-sanctions period
and 1 on the first year of renewed economic sanctions. Once a sanctions recurrence is observed, I
stop observing the aftermath of the episode in consideration. Since the outcome variable is binary, I
use logistic regression. I also use robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the target state to
take potential dependence among targets into account.
Of the 358 unique security-related sanctions imposed between 1945 and 2005, 133 of them
recurred, accounting for 37% of the cases. I also coded the issue(s) under contention for the new
sanctions episode and whether it is the same as the initial episode or not. Interestingly, the majority
of new sanctions episodes are triggered by a different offensive behavior than the one triggered the
initial sanctions. Only 35 of those 133 instances of recurrence are due to the same issue that initially
triggered sanctions.
Key Explanatory Variables
Hypothesis 1 suggests that senders are more likely to initiate new sanctions episodes in response to
their target’s pursuit of offensive behavior following sanctions removal. To test this hypothesis, I need
a measure of whether the target pursues an offensive behavior in the aftermath of sanctions removal.
What constitutes an offensive behavior differs for senders. Therefore, I identify several high-stake
foreign policy challenges that are widely accepted to be offensive and code the Bad Behavior variable
compiling information from multiple data sources. First, I code whether the target is recorded as
a trigger state in the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Dataset (Brecher et al., 2017). The ICB
Dataset provides information on interstate military-security crisis and covers the entire temporal
scope of my sample. If the target state is recorded as a trigger/initiator of a military-security crisis in
a given post-sanctions year, I code Bad Behavior as 1. Second, I use information from Militarized
Interstate Disputes (v4.1) Dataset (Palmer et al., 2015) that codes cases of conflict in which the
threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards
another state. I code Bad Behavior as 1 if the target state initiates a militarized interstate dispute in
the aftermath of sanctions removal. Third, Militarized Compellent Threat Dataset (Sechser, 2011)
records instances of an explicit demand by one state that another state alters the status quo in some
material way, backed by a threat of military force if the state does not comply. If the target country
is coded a challenger in the MCT Dataset in a given year in the post-sanctions period, I code Bad
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Behavior as 1. Lastly, I code the variable as 1 if the target engages in one-sided violence, the use of
armed force against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths (Eck and Hultman, 2007; Allansson,
Melander and Themner, 2017).
To test Hypothesis 2, I create a binary variable measuring whether a sender country brings
to power a new leader whose primary support is drawn from different societal groups than those
who supported her predecessor, using the Change in Source of Leader Support (CHISOLS) Dataset
(Mattes, Leeds and Matsumura, 2016). The variable captures the instances of leader changes that is
also associated with a change in source of leader support, cases in which the subset of societal groups
whose support allows the leader to retain power differs between the new leader and her predecessor.
In coding the variable, I first identified who the leader was and what her political affiliation was at
the time of sanctions removal, and code whether the leader of the country in a given post-sanctions
year belong to the same societal support base or not. I code the Change in Source of Leader Support
variable as 0 for the years in which the same leader who ended sanctions or a different leader with
the same political affiliation is in power. The variable is coded as 1 only if the sender country is ruled
by a new leader that receives its support from a different societal base than her predecessor who
ended sanctions.
For example, the U.S. imposed sanctions on Romania in 1950 and lifted them in 1960 when
Republican President Eisenhower was in power. The case enters into the dataset with the termination
of sanctions and I observe the dyad from 1961 until the end of 1970, the tenth post-sanctions year.
The Change in Source of Leader Support variable is coded as 1 for the years between 1961 and
1968, since the U.S. had two Democratic presidents in that period, President Kennedy and President
Johnson, and their source of domestic support was different than Eisenhower’s. The variable is coded
as 0 in the year of 1969, since President Nixon, a Republican politician, took office and his support
base was the same as Eisenhower’s.
For the cases where the leadership in the sender country changes in the same year as sanctions
termination, I examine the exact date of sanctions removal and leadership change to accurately code
the variable. For instance, the U.S. ends sanctions on Nicaragua in 1993 and President Clinton takes
office in the same year, following President Bush. Before coding the Change in Source of Leader
Support, I first identify that the sanctions were terminated on April 1993, 3 months after Clinton took
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office. Therefore, I code whether the U.S. has a new leader with a new political support base in the
post-sanctions period, using Democratic President Clinton as the comparison point.
Control Variables
Additionally, I control for other factors that can predict the likelihood of sanctions recurrence. First, I
include a measure of Foreign Policy Affinity, using data assembled from UN General Assembly votes
(Voeten, Strezhnev and Bailey, 2009). The dataset provides a score of foreign policy similarity within
dyads ranging from -1 (least similar) to 1 (most similar). In line with the literature on sanctions onset,
I expect this variable to be inversely related to the likelihood of sanctions removal. Second, I control
for the relative strength of the sender to the target, using the Composite Index of National Capability
(CINC) (Singer, 1987).
In addition, I control for three characteristics of the initial sanctions. First, I account for how
initial sanctions ended. I code Target Acquiescence as 1 if the initial sanctions ended with the
target’s partial or full concessions, or a negotiated settlement, and 0 if the sanctions ended with
sender capitulation. If the initial sanctions ended with target concessions, non-compliance in the
post-sanctions period can be more likely to be punished than a case where the episode ended with
sender capitulation.39 Second, I code Multilateral as 0 if the initial episode was unilateral, and as
1 if it was initiated through an international organization or had multiple senders. Since attracting
the same level of support for new sanctions is often challenging, I expect to find that multilateral
sanctions are less likely to recur. I also control for whether the initial sanctions had one or more
issues under contention. Multiple Issues variable is coded as 0 if TIES data codes just a single
security-related issue as the trigger of sanctions, and 1 if there were more than one issues under
contention.
There are many sender-target dyads with more than one peace spell in the data set. Treating these
observations independent could possibly bias coefficient estimates. Therefore, I generate a count
variable named Frequency of the Dyad that counts the number of times the sender-target dyad appears
in the dataset up until the time an episode enters into the dataset. The variable accounts for the history
of economic conflict between the sender and the target and higher frequency of sanctioning activity
39As an additional robustness check, I also restricted the sample to the set of cases where Target Acquiescence is coded
as 1.
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can predict future economic conflict. Lastly, I control for the temporal dependency by using cubic
polynomial approximation (Carter and Signorino, 2010). I first add the Count of Post-Sanctions
Years, a duration variable measuring the length of post-sanctions economic peace spell. The variable
is coded as 1 for the first post-sanctions year of a given sanctions episode, 2 for its second year, 3 for
its third year, and 10 for its tenth year. I also add its squared and cubed terms as regressors.
Results
Table 3 presents the results of a logistic regression. Each model tests the effect of independent
and control variables discussed above on the likelihood of sanctions recurrence. Model 1 uses the
full sample of post-sanction years of each security-related sanctions episode. Model 2 restricts the
sample to cases where the sender of the initial episode was a democratic state. The justification
for this restriction is two-fold: First, the operationalization of Bad Behavior can be argued to be
from a democratic sender’s perspective. Second, the domestic theory of sanctions recurrence might
be more applicable to democratic senders, as the link between public opinion and foreign policy
decision making is stronger in democracies (Risse-Kappen, 1991). Model 3 restricts the sample to
the cases where the target is engaging in an offensive behavior in the aftermath of the removal of
initial sanctions. This model captures the likelihood of the sender to respond to the target’s pursuit of
an offensive behavior with new sanctions.
In both Model 1 and 2, Bad Behavior’s coefficient estimate is positive, but does not achieve
conventional levels of statistical significance. In other words, the analysis did not reveal any
significant differences between targets that pursue an offensive behavior and targets that do not.
Therefore, the results do not provide support for Hypothesis 1, the bargaining theory of sanctions
recurrence. On the contrary, it suggests that sanctions recurrence cannot be conceptualized as a
mere reaction of the sender to the target’s offensive behavior in the post-sanctions period. Sanctions
research that conceptualizes sanctions episodes as an outcome of the strategic interaction between
the sender and the target assumes that the goal of economic sanctions is to alter the behavior of the
target by increasing the costs associated with that behavior. However, the results show that target’s
behavior does not shape the sender’s decision to initiate new sanctions.
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Table 3: Logistic Regression: Sanctions Recurrence
DV: Initiating a New Sanctions Episode Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Bad Behavior 0.302 0.479
(0.28) (0.28)
Change in Source of Leader Support 0.580* 0.589* 0.995**
(0.24) (0.26) (0.34)
Growth of S’s Trade with T -0.475** -0.515** -0.207
(0.17) (0.17) (0.23)
Foreign Policy Affinity -0.712** -0.730*** -0.641*
(0.23) (0.21) (0.28)
Frequency of the Dyad 0.323*** 0.327*** 0.292***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07)
Multilateral 0.572* 0.521* 0.401
(0.25) (0.23) (0.34)
Multiple Issues -0.409 -0.623* -0.806*
(0.24) (0.27) (0.38)
Relative CINC Scores -0.000* -0.000 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Target Acquiescence 0.268 0.275 0.024
(0.23) (0.23) (0.29)
Count of Post-Sanctions Years -0.211*** -0.180** -0.227**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Constant -4.138*** -4.134*** -3.508***
(0.36) (0.37) (0.53)
N 2153 1566 619
- Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
- Estimates are derived from a logistic regression model and standard errors are clustered around the target state.
- Temporal controls are omitted.
50
The domestic theory of sanctions recurrence, on the other hand, is empirically supported. The
results suggest that senders’ domestic considerations do shape whether they will choose to initiate
new economic sanctions in the aftermath of sanctions removal. Change in Source of Leader Support’s
coefficient estimate is positive and statistically significant across all model specifications. Confirming
Hypothesis 2, the results show that sanctions are more likely to recur if the sender country has a new
leader in power in the post-sanctions period and if the new leader is supported by a different social
base than the base of its predecessor who ended sanctions. I argue that these new leaders are immune
from the domestic costs of sanctions recurrence, such as signaling foreign policy inconsistency
and admitting wrong-doing, but on the contrary, they may expect domestic gains from sanctions
recurrence by appealing to their political base and special interest groups that incur losses from
sanctions removal. The support for the domestic theory of sanctions recurrence is even more visible
in Model 3, since the results hold even for the sample restricted to the cases where the target is
engaging in an offensive behavior. In these cases, whether there is a change in source of leader
support is still a significant determinant of the sender’s decision to initiate a new sanctions episode.
Taken as a whole, the results show that sanctions recurrence is primarily shaped by senders’ domestic
considerations and does not occur in reaction to targets’ offensive behavior in the post-sanctions
period.
Figure 6 portrays the main result visually. The x-axis presents the range of the binary variable
Change in Source of Leader Support; such that the bar on the left are the cases where the variable
is equal to 0 and the the bar on the right indicates the cases where the variable is equal to 1. The
y-axis indicates the predictive probability of sanctions recurrence. The heights of the bars show the
likelihood of sanctions recurrence at
The probability of sanctions recurrence doubles if a new leader takes that represents a different
societal group in the aftermath of sanctions removal. Even if this is a significant increase, it is
important to note that the likelihood of sanctions recurrence is still very low. This is expected given
the low frequency of sanctions removal. In my dataset, sanctions recurrence dependent variable is
coded as 1 in only 4.8 percent of the cases.
The results for the control variables included in the models also merit discussion as they can
inform our understanding on sanctions recurrence and provide opportunities for future research. In
line with the findings of sanctions onset literature, as the foreign policy affinity between the sender
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Figure 6: Predictive Margins - The Effect of SOLS Change on Pr(Sanctions Recurrence)
and the target increases, the likelihood of sanctions removal diminishes. Moreover, Frequency of
the Dyad’s positive and statistically significant coefficient indicates that sender-target dyads with
a history of economic sanctions are more likely to relapse into renewed sanctions, suggesting path
dependency.
The results of Multilateral and Multiple Issues require further discussion and potentially future
research. Initially, I expected to find that multilateral sanctions are harder to re-initiate, assuming that
it is hard to maintain the level of support that the initial sanctions had and to convince the coalition
members for new sanctions. However, the results provide support for the opposite, and show that
multilateral sanctions are more likely to recur than unilateral ones. The coefficient estimate for
Multiple Issues is negative in all models, and statistically significant in Model 2 and 3, suggesting
that the sanctions that were initially imposed for more than one offensive behavior of the target are
less likely to recur. More research is needed to explore the relationship between these two sanction
characteristics and sanctions recurrence.
Conclusion
This article explores the conditions under which economic sanctions recur. It presents two competing
hypotheses and analyzes whether sanctions recur due to concerns about the target’s behavior in the
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post-sanctions period, or due to the sender’s domestic considerations. The empirical results lend
support for the domestic politics explanation. I find that the sender country is more likely to initiate
a new sanctions episode against its target in the aftermath of sanctions removal, if the sources of
leader support changes following the termination of sanctions. The causal mechanism I propose is
two-fold: First, I argue that sanctions recurrence is costlier for the leaders that gave the decision to
end sanctions. Initiating a new sanctions episode signals foreign policy inconsistency and admits
wrong-doing. Moreover, the decision is likely to be opposed by the special interest groups that were
influential in the initial decisions to end sanctions. If, however, the leader of the sender country
changes in the post-sanctions period, and the new leader receives its support from a different societal
base than its predecessor, sanctions recurrence will not create the same degree of costs. On the
contrary, it might generate domestic benefits.
In addition to presenting findings about when sanctions recur, this study has important implica-
tions for future sanctions research. It proposes a new avenue of research that integrates the aftermath
of sanctions removal into the theories of sanctioning process. There are a number of interesting and
policy-relevant questions that can be answered by examining how sender-target relations evolve in
the aftermath of sanctions removal.
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CHAPTER 4: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND
FIRMS’ EX ANTE RISK ASSESSMENT
The sanctions literature follows the argument that senders aim to cause economic pain in the
target country by restricting trade and financial transactions (Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi, 2014;
Hufbauer et al., 2007). The goal of this intended economic pain is to convince the target to alter
its policies that are against senders’ interests. However, sanctions often lack the ability to impose
significant costs due to target’s ability to adjust. Targeted governments can offset the costs of
sanctions through black market activity (Andreas, 2005; Niblock, 2001), substitution (Peksen and
Peterson, 2015), and sanctions-busting (Early, 2011, 2015).
Targeted governments are not the only actors that look for alternative sources of economic gain
when faced with sanctions. The imposition of sanctions affects the revenue streams of the private
firms in the sender country as well. These firms also start looking for alternative sources of profit
when their home governments (senders) restrict their exchanges with their international partners
(targets). In fact, Lektzian and Biglaiser (2013) show how U.S. sanctions lead to disinvestment by U.S.
firms in target countries and Barry and Kleinberg (2015) complement this finding by demonstrating
that U.S. firms increase foreign direct investment (FDI) in third states that can provide indirect access
to the target country’s economy.
In this chapter, I explore the conditions under which U.S. firms choose to invest or re-invest in
the targeted countries following sanctions removal. I argue that the decision to end sanctions provides
a signal to the multinational corporations (MNCs) of the sender country that the relations between
their home state (the sender) and the potential host state (the target) are normalizing and the business
environment of the targeted country is becoming more favorable for future investment. Even if this
signal is an indication of lucrative opportunities for private firms, the uncertainty remains about the
possibility of sanctions recurrence. How do private firms decide whether to invest in markets that
were previously sanctioned by their home governments? I answer this question by analyzing private
investors’ ex ante assessment of sanctions recurrence.
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I argue that FDI flows from U.S. firms into economies previously targeted with U.S. sanctions
are higher in cases where the expected likelihood of sanctions recurrence is low. To assess the risk
of sanctions recurrence, firms seek information from both their home government (the sender) and
the host government (the target). First, firms evaluate the likelihood of foreign policy continuity in
their home state by observing the domestic politics. I argue that if the leader who ended sanctions
continues to stay in office following sanctions removal, or his predecessor represents the same
political party, this serves as a credible signal to firms that the risk of sanctions recurrence is low. If,
however, a new president takes office who is from a different political party than his predecessor,
foreign policy reversal and sanctions recurrence become a real risk. In these cases, I show that the
firms’ investment decisions is based on the public support the new leader enjoys and the relationship
between approval ratings and FDI inflows is curvilinear for these new leaders. Second, firms observe
the outcome of sanctions to infer the risk of sanctions recurrence. I demonstrate that FDI inflow
into target countries from senders’ firms increases in the aftermath of sanctions removal if sanctions
ended with complete target acquiescence or sender capitulation, a decisive outcome.
Sanctions and Foreign Direct Investment
The existing literature on international capital flows provides strong evidence that markets charac-
terized by risk find it difficult to attract FDI. The high sunk costs, relatively lower mobility, and
the long-term nature of foreign direct investment imply high costs for exiting markets for investors
(Jensen, 2008). Therefore, firms are wary of uncertainty in host markets and look to invest in
countries that can minimize these risks. The risks that firms attempt to minimize are often political in
nature. Fear of expropriation and breach of contracts (Markusen, 2001; Li, 2009), risk of domestic
political unrest (Braithwaite, Kucik and Maves, 2014), presence or anticipation of internal or external
armed conflict (Bussman, 2010; Jensen, 2008; Busse and Hefeker, 2007), and regime instability (Li
and Resnick, 2003; Tomashevskiy, 2017) are known to inhibit investment in host countries. Firms’
FDI location decisions are directly influenced by assessment of these risks.40
40Firms also weigh these risks against economic benefits provided by host economies. Market size, trade and capital
openness, development, and economic growth are known to encourage FDI in a given country. Also See Li (2006) for a
discussion of tax and non-tax incentive programs adopted by host governments designed to attract foreign capital.
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Even if the majority of the FDI determinants literature focuses on host characteristics, a few
studies investigate home government-host government relations that influence firms’ investment
decisions (Li and Vashchilko, 2009; Leblang, 2010; Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2007). A factor that is
often overlooked in the political economy literature about investor risk calculation is the presence of
economic conflict between home governments and potential hosts, or the expectation of it. Economic
sanctions increase the risks associated with commercial relations with host states, making some
investors reluctant to do business with and invest in economies targeted with economic sanctions.
In some sanctions cases, the sender can directly block its firms from engaging in any economic
exchanges with the target country and threaten to prosecute companies that do not comply with the
restrictions. U.S. sanctions imposed on Cuba, North Korea, Iran, or Libya are examples of such
comprehensive sanctions. It is true that such comprehensive sanctions are not common, and senders
rarely include legal provisions in their sanctions acts that restrict the activities of their domestic
firms. Moreover, the ability of senders to domestically enforce sanctions can be limited (Bapat and
Kwon, 2015), and governments can even be incentivized not to strictly enforce sanctions due to
their potential harm on domestic firms’ competitiveness in international markets (Morgan and Bapat,
2003). However, firms’ risk assessment about investing in targeted countries is not only influenced
by the increased risk of facing punishment from their home government.
Economic sanctions can also indirectly hurt investors and discourage FDI in targeted countries
by limiting firms’ ability to profit. First, sanctions can restrict trade with the targeted country, thereby
limiting MNCs’ ability to export goods to their home country or into the international markets.
Second, sanctions are known to have disproportionate economic impact on citizens of the targeted
country rather than the leadership (Drury and Li, 2006; Lopez and Cortright, 1997). Therefore,
sanctions can hurt the ability of the consumers of the targeted country to buy goods and limit the
opportunities of MNCs in the target country, especially the ones that was attracted to the host country
due to its market size. Third, economic sanctions can lead to the elimination of incentives from the
sender government to its MNCs. For instance, Export-Import Bank (EIB) and the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) are two U.S. government agencies that support MNC activities
abroad. The EIB offers loans for borrowers to purchase U.S. MNC goods operating in the borrower’s
country and the OPIC offers risk insurance to U.S. MNCs. As discussed by Biglaiser and Lektzian
(2011), sanctions are likely to limit the support and incentives that the U.S. government provide to
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its firms operating in the targeted countries, thereby increasing the costs of their investment. Lastly,
sanctions can have adverse effects in the target country which then can intensify the political risks that
MNCs are wary of. Economic sanctions increases repression and political violence in target countries
(Allen, 2004; Wood, 2008), deteriorate private property rights (Peksen, 2017), and destabilize leaders
politically (Marinov, 2005; Escriba-Folch and Wright, 2010). These demonstrated adverse effects of
economic sanctions exacerbate the risk perception of investors. For these reasons, the presence or
the expectation of economic sanctions may cause firms of the sender country to disinvest from the
targeted countries.
Biglaiser and Lektzian (2011) empirically show that U.S. investors pull out of countries targeted
by U.S. sanctions, especially when sanctions impose major costs to the target’s economy and the U.S.
pursues major policy goals with a stronger incentive to enforce sanctions domestically. Barry and
Kleinberg (2015) complement this finding and show that U.S. firms shift investment to states that can
provide indirect access to the target country’s economy, such as the major trading partners of the
sanctioned country.
Sanctions Removal and Foreign Direct Investment
However, once sanctions are lifted, the economic environment of the targeted economy begins to
look more favorable for foreign investors of the sender country. First, it becomes legal to invest in
the previously targeted economy and MNCs’ risk of being penalized by their home government for
investing in the target’s economy disappears. More importantly, sanctions removal provides new
lucrative economic opportunities for private investors and firms. These opportunities often arise
due to the access to a new market and the targets’ potential to grow its economy in the absence
of sanctions. Moreover, the reward in investing in previously targeted economies might be higher
shortly after the removal of economic sanctions, since early investors can avoid competition and
thus have proprietary access to lucrative contracts (Appel and Loyle, 2012). Overall, the decision
to end sanctions sends a positive signal to MNCs and private investors about the future of the
home government-host government relations, as well as the improving business environment of the
previously targeted economies. Therefore, sanctions removal can promote investor confidence, and
targets can become attractive locations for MNCs to invest or re-invest.
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In addition to the lucrative opportunities previously targeted nations may offer, they also pose
considerable risks for investors. One of the main risks that investors need to account for is the
likelihood of sanctions recurrence. Investors consider the threat of disinvestment when they invest
(Tomashevskiy, 2017), and the risk of sanctions recurrence should affect MNCs’ investment decisions
in previously targeted countries. Therefore, the question is, whether the decision to end sanctions
can give confidence to MNCs about the long-term safety of their potential investments in the target’s
economy.
In an uncertain environment about the safety of their investments, firms tend to withhold
investment until uncertainty regarding the future of their investment is eliminated (Rodrik, 1991).
Forward-looking investors are concerned about minimizing the risk of disinvestment, and therefore,
they seek commitments to ensure that their investments will be safe in the long-run. I argue that
investors attempt to minimize their risk by seeking credible commitments both from their home
government and host governments that sanctions will not be put back on, and sender-target relations
continue to strengthen in the years following sanctions removal.
First, firms look for cues about foreign policy continuity from their home government, by
specifically observing the developments in domestic politics. Investors dislike political uncertainty
about future policies of their home governments, especially the ones that will directly affect their
financial situation, business environment, and investment decisions (Frot and Santiso, 2013). To
reduce this political uncertainty, I argue that investors observe two main sources of information to
assess the likelihood of sanctions recurrence. First, they observe whether or not the leader in power
shares the foreign policy views of the leader that ended sanctions. Second, they observe the level of
public support the leader enjoys. The first short-cut captures the leader’s potential intent for policy
reversal, and the second short-cut captures the ability of the leader to reverse course in foreign policy.
The political uncertainty, thus the uncertainty about sanctions recurrence, is expected to be very
low if the same leader continues to govern the country in the aftermath of sanctions removal. As
discussed more in detail in Chapter 3, leaders favor foreign policy continuity during their tenure since
foreign policy inconsistency is often perceived as evidence of incompetence by the public (Tomz,
2007; Kertzer and Zeitzoff, 2017). Reinstating the very same sanctions they lifted would inevitably
signal foreign policy inconsistency and incompetence for leaders. Moreover, the decision to renew
sanctions can send the signal that the initial decision to end sanctions was a mistake. Relying on this
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logic, firms can be fairly confident that the relations of their home government with the target state
will continue to improve in the aftermath of sanctions removal and the normalization process will
not be interrupted by sanctions recurrence. Therefore, I argue that firms are more likely to invest
in previously targeted countries if the leader who made the decision to end sanctions continues to
remain in office.
However, firms’ political certainty may not last for an extended period of time, especially in
democracies where leader turnover is common with normal elections. Elections are a common
source of political uncertainty for firms. Markets react negatively in the prelude to elections due
to uncertainty such contests create (Pantzalis, Strangeland and Turtle, 2000; Frantz, 2018). And
sometimes, upcoming elections, and the political uncertainty they create encourage individuals or
businesses to delay or reduce certain types of investment until the race concludes (Canes-Wrone and
Park, 2014; Julio and Yook, 2012). Therefore, election results are an important source of information
for firms considering investing in countries previously targeted with sanctions and assessing the risk
of sanctions recurrence.
If the leader who ended sanctions gets reelected for a second term, the election outcome does
not necessarily create fear for firms about foreign policy discontinuity and the likelihood of sanctions
recurrence. Similarly, if a new leader takes office in their home country, but this new leader is from
the same political party as his predecessor, firms can perceive this as a signal of foreign policy
continuity and a low chance of sanctions recurrence. However, if the election brings a new leader to
power and the new leader is from a different political party than his predecessor who ended sanctions,
firms’ political uncertainty heightens. Since the new leader with a different political affiliation
represents a different societal base with distinct preferences, he might be incentivized to reverse his
predecessors’ foreign policies and renew sanctions.
Overall, observing the leader of the country, his political affiliation and societal or interest groups
he represents provide information to firms about the leader’s potential intent for renewing sanctions.
However, not all new leaders will be able to reverse the foreign policies of their predecessor and
renew sanctions. Firms need to distinguish between leaders that are more likely to renew sanctions
than the leaders that are less likely to do so. To this end, the second source of information MNCs
use to assess the likelihood of sanctions recurrence is the level of public support the new president
enjoys.
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More specifically, I propose a curvilinear relation between the new president’s approval ratings
and the levels of FDI that the target state can attract following sanctions removal. If the new leader is
from a different political party than his predecessor that ended sanctions, and the new leader is highly
popular, reversing his predecessor’s policies and renewing sanctions are expected to be a relatively
easy task. First, presidents that enjoy high approval ratings are often more capable of pushing forward
their agenda than the presidents that are less popular. Presidential approval is assumed to serve
as a proxy for voter preferences (Edwards, 1997), which may have representational implications
(Cohen and Rottinghaus, 2018). Due to this, presidents with high approval ratings tend to have strong
legislative support (Canes-Wrone and Marchi, 2002; Canes-Wrone and Shotts, 2004). Therefore, if
the new president with high approval ratings chooses to renew sanctions through the legislative body,
firms should expect that they can.
On the other hand, If the new leader that is from a different political party than his predecessor
has low levels of approval ratings, firms might also perceive a high risk environment for sanctions
recurrence. Leaders are driven by the desire to remain in office (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005;
Huth, 1996) and they view approval as an asset and disapproval as a political cost (Edwards, 1997).
Therefore, leaders seek policies, including foreign policies, that will bolster their public support and
increase the chances of political survival.
The diversionary foreign policy literature often focuses on how bold foreign policy can be used
by presidents to combat declining performance evaluations (DeRouen, 2000). However, this requires
the availability of a foreign affairs issue on which the new leader can capitalize so as to offer a
portrait of strength (Druckman, Jacobs and Ostermeier, 2004). A recent removal sanctions can serve
as such an opportunity for new leaders. Moreover, criticizing the previous administration’s foreign
policies and reversing these policies can serve as a tool for new leaders to differentiate themselves
from their predecessor and solidify their base (Hermann, 1990).
Contrary to the presidents that enjoy high approval ratings, unpopular presidents often struggle
to convince the Congress, or the legislative bodies in parliamentary democracies, to carry out their
agenda (Rivers and Rose, 1985; Brule, 2008). Therefore, despite the incentives low approval ratings
create to renew sanctions, it might be hard to pass the decision from the legislature. However,
sanctions can also be imposed unilaterally by the executive body in many democracies. And such
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presidential unilateralism is more common for leaders that has relatively lower approval ratings
(Beckmann, 2010; Mayer, 1999; Shull, 2006).
In sum, firms assess the safety of their long-term investments in targeted nations by assessing the
likelihood of sanctions recurrence. To do so, domestic politics of their home government serves as a
source of information about the safety of their investments. While the leaders that share the foreign
policy views of the leaders who ended sanctions give confidence to firms about the safety of their
investments, new leaders with a different foreign policy view may not be able to provide the same
level of assurances. I argue that their ability of assure firms depends on the level of public support
they enjoy as a proxy of their ability to reverse their predecessor’s foreign policies. New leaders with
high or low approval ratings are expected to signal a high likelihood of sanctions recurrence to firms.
In these cases, firms are expected to be cautious against investing in the countries previously targeted
with economic sanctions. However, moderate levels of presidential public support may not be very
informative for private investors in the sender country about the likelihood of sanctions recurrence.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: FDI flow from the sender country to the target country is likely to be lower following
sanctions removal when a new leader with different policy preferences than his predecessor who
ended sanctions takes office and when this new leader has high or low approval ratings.
In searching for cues about the likelihood of sanctions recurrence, firms also observe how the
initial sanctions ended. Firms are profit-driven entities and thus, when making decisions about
investing in previously targeted economies, they are primarily interested in profit. To this end, I
argue that they seek assurances that sanctions will not recur. They are, however, not concerned about
whether the sanctioning effort was successful for their home government in altering the behavior of
the target state. It is true that if sanctions ended with a complete target concession, firms can take
this as a signal of lower risk sanctions recurrence due to lower perceived risk of target recidivism.
However, I argue that sanctions ended with complete sender capitulation send the same signal as
complete target acquiescence. The commonality between a complete target acquiescence and sender
capitulation from the perspective of firms is the fact that the outcome is definitive. However, the cases
that ended with only a partial concessions by the target, or a negotiated settlement, are expected to be
more prone to recurring. Therefore, I argue that firms consider the target state as a relatively safe
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host government to invest if the sanctions episode involving them ended with a definitive outcome.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
H2: FDI flow from the sender country to the target country is likely to be greater following sanc-
tions removal when initial sanctions end with complete target acquiescence or sender capitulation.41
Data and Research Design
To test my hypotheses, I create a time-series cross-sectional dataset where sanctions episodes enter
into the dataset once they have been lifted. The sender-target dyad of each case is observed for 10
years following the removal year of sanctions. The unit of analysis is dyad-year for the aftermath of
each security related sanctions episode. The analysis covers the years between 1966-2001. Data on
economic sanctions is available for the years between 1945 and 2005, however, the availability of
FDI data limits the temporal scope of the analysis.
In line with the research designs used for previous chapters, I limit my focus to security-related
sanctions.42 Trade-related sanctions are imposed due to the target’s trade practices or economic
policies and tend to be less severe. More importantly, previous research has shown that trade sanctions
often do not cause firms based in the sender country to withdraw from or withhold investment into
the targeted countries (Biglaiser and Lektzian, 2011). Therefore, the theory presented in this chapter
is not applicable to trade sanctions and their exclusion is appropriate.
I also limit the analysis to the aftermath of sanctions imposed and lifted by the United States for
three main reasons. First, the U.S. government collects data on private firms’ activities abroad and
makes it public. More importantly, this data reports bilateral FDI flows and allows me to capture
US FDI inflow into specific target countries. Second, the U.S. is the most active sender identified in
the TIES dataset. There are 358 unique sanctions cases that were imposed and lifted between the
years 1945 and 2013, and 215 of those cases were primarily imposed and lifted by the United States,
41In theory, this relationship can also be expected to be conditional upon the domestic politics of the home government.
I aim to explore the link between the two hypotheses by examining how firms assess the outcome of initial sanctions
differently for different leaderships in the country.
42Containing political influence and military behavior, destabilizing regimes, demanding the release of citizens or
property, solving territorial disputes, denying strategic material, retaliating for alliance choices, demanding human rights
improvements, ending weapons proliferation, terminating support of non-state actors and punishing drug trafficking are
considered as security-related goals.
62
accounting for 60 percent of the cases. Third, the U.S. occupies a unique position in the global
economy as the largest investor of FDI. For instance, in 2016, Hong Kong, the United Kingdom,
Japan, and Germany rank as the next largest overseas direct investors, with individual outward
investment positions about one-fourth or less than that of the United States (Jackson, 2017).
To identify the set of cases imposed and lifted by the United States, I rely on the “primary sender”
variable of the TIES Dataset. A primary sender is coded as the state that proposes sanctions or is
responsible for mobilizing other states to initiate sanctions. These cases are not solely unilateral
sanctions imposed by the U.S. and the sample includes multilateral cases, cases that are initiated
through international institutions, and the cases that has multiple senders, where the U.S. is coded as
the “primary sender.”43
Finally, I use the approach adopted in Chapter 3 to account for sanctions episodes with no
recorded end dates in the TIES Dataset. Specifically, I use the information on the year of the last
reported incident provided by the TIES Dataset. The variable named ongoing as of year identifies
the last year in which the data collectors were able to obtain information on the case and no further
information about the case was found. I treat the year after the ongoing as of year as the end year
and construct post-sanction years for the years following that end date. In the sample limited to U.S.
sanctions, there are 16 cases with no recorded end dates and dropping them out of the analysis would
result in a loss of valuable information.44
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this study is the net yearly U.S. FDI inflow into the target country in
the aftermath of sanctions removal. I use the data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
for the years between 1966 and 2000.45 The BEA Data measures the net capital outflow data in
current US dollars, consisting of funds that US parent firms provide to their foreign affiliates net
of funds that foreign affiliates provide to their US parents. The dependent variable, FDI Inflow, is
4358 of 215 cases where the U.S. is coded as the primary sender are multilateral, while the remaining 157 cases are
unilateral.
44It is important to note that they are dropped for the analysis to test Hypothesis 2, since the cases with no end dates also
do not have a record of sanctions outcome.
45The Bureau of Economic Analysis. U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Balance of Payments and Direct Investment
Position Data. Retrieved from: https://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdbal.htm
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coded as a target country’s net FDI inflow from US-based private investors in a given year following
sanctions removal. It is a continuous variable ranging from -4601 to 16428 in millions of current
U.S. dollars. The distribution of the variable is highly skewed. To address this problem and smooth
the distribution, I use an inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation.46
Independent Variables
To test Hypothesis 1 and operationalize the expected probability of foreign policy continuity, I use
two main measures, mapping onto the two main cues that firms seek. To capture the intent of foreign
policy reversal, I borrow Change in Source of Leader Support variable from Chapter 3, coded using
the CHISOLS dataset (Mattes, Leeds and Matsumura, 2016). It is a dichotomous variable coded
as 1 if the sender country, the U.S. for the purposes of this chapter, has a new leader in a given
post-sanctions year that belongs to a different political party than his predecessor who lifted sanctions.
The variable is coded as 0 either if the leader who ended sanctions is still in power or if the new
leader that replaced him has the same political affiliation.47 For instance, if a Republican president
ends sanctions, the variable is coded as 1 for all the years in which a Democrat president is in office
and as 0 for all the years in which a Republication president is in office.48
Second, I use a measure to capture the level of public support a given president enjoys as a proxy
of his ability to renew sanctions. To code the Presidential Approval variable, I use the “Presidential
Job Approval Data” compiled by the Gallup Poll and published by the American Presidency Project
(Woolley and Peters, 1999). The job approval percentages are recorded in response to the “Do
you approve or disapprove of the way [first and last name of the president] is handling his job as
President?” The respondents choose between “Approve”, “Disapprove”, and “Unsure” in response to
46See Appendix C for descriptive statistics and histogram of the FDI data, the transformed FDI data and more information
of the computation of the IHS transformation.
47Not all sanctions are imposed by the President. The Congress has been an active actor that devises and implements
sanctions policies. Therefore, indicators such as executive-legislative unity and the political composition of the Congress
can also be influential in firms’ risk assessments following sanctions removal. Future work should consider the role of
these legislative actors in signaling foreign policy continuity or discontinuity to private firms.
48The variable is distributed across the sample fairly evenly. It is equal to 1 in 47 percent of the observations and to 0 in
the remaining 53 percent.
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Figure 7: Histogram of Presidential Approval
the question and I use the approval percentages.49 Figure 1 presents the distribution of the variable in
my dataset.
To capture the expected curvilinear effect of presidential approval on foreign direct investment
flows, I compute the squared term of Presidential Approval. To test the expectation that this
curvilinear relationship exists for new leaders that represent a different societal coalition from the
leader that ended sanctions, I introduce a three-way interaction by interacting Change in Leader
Support Variable with the squared Presidential Approval variable.
To test Hypothesis 2, I use the Final Outcome variable recorded in the TIES Dataset. The
TIES Dataset codes five distinct outcomes for imposed sanctions: partial acquiescence by the target,
complete acquiescence by the target, capitulation by the sender, stalemate, or a negotiated settlement.
I code Decisive Final Outcome variable as 1 if the sanctions ended with complete target acquiescence
or capitulation by sender after imposition, and 0 for the other three outcomes.
Control Variables
I include several other predictors of FDI flows that may confound the estimates if omitted. I group
the control variables into three categories: targets’ economic characteristics, political characteristics,
and home-host state relations.
49Unsure and No Data categories are reported together in one variable and the value of the Unsure/No Data variable
ranges from 3 percent to 22 percent. In the analysis presented here, I use the approval percentages. However, I acknowledge
that a 50 percent approval rating with a 3 percent unsure/no data and a 50 percent approval rating with a 22 percent
unsure/no data can be substantively distinct.
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Macroeconomic Conditions and Economic Incentives
Capital account openness is known to be an important driver of private investment (Coan and Kugler,
2008). To capture this, I first include a measure of the degree of the target’s capital account openness,
using the index introduced by Chinn and Ito (2006). Higher levels of Financial Openness indicate
lower levels of restrictions on the target’s external accounts.
The literature FDI determinants has also established that states with larger markets and higher
levels of economic growth attract higher levels of FDI (Caves, 2007; Chakrabarti, 2001; Asiedu,
2006). I control for the target’s population size as an indicator of its market size, using data from
Gleditsch (2002). I take the natural logarithm of this variable to smooth its distribution. Next, I
measure Economic Growth as the percentage change in the country’s GDP from the previous year,
taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.50
Home-Host State Relations
Next, I include two variables that control for the economic relations between the U.S. (firms’ home
state) and the target countries (host states). U.S. Distance variable measures targets’ total geographic
distance from the United States, generated using EUGene (Scott and Stam, 2000). I expect the
variable to be negatively associated with FDI flow into target countries, since more distant markets
may be generally less accessible for U.S. firms and the operations in distant areas can be more costly
(Guerin, 2006). Second, I control for the dyadic trade between the U.S. and the target state in a given
post-sanctions year, using COW’s Bilateral Trade Dataset (version 4.0) (Barbieri and Pollins, 2009;
Barbieri and Keshk, 2016).
Political Characteristics
As a final set of control variables, I control for the political characteristics of the potential host
countries. The literature on the link between FDI activity and the regime type of host countries
presents mixed findings. However, excluding indicators of regime type from the analysis may
confound the results. I specifically control for the Executive Constraints variable of the Polity IV
50The World Bank, World Development Indicators (2016). GDP Growth (annual %). Retrieved from
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG.
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data (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2013). Leaders that have more institutionalized constraints on
their decision-making powers might be better equipped to send more credible signals to investors
about the respect for property rights and contractual obligations. The Executive Constraints variable
is an ordinal variable ranging from 1 (unlimited executive authority) to 7 (executive parity or
subordination).51 Second, I control for the targets’ regime durability. This variable is also taken
from the Polity IV data and measures the number of years since the target state has shifted three or
more points on the Polity scale within a three-year span.52 Higher values of Executive Constraints
and Regime Durability are expected to be associated with higher levels of FDI inflow to the target
countries following sanctions removal.
Finally, I add a lagged dependent variable (FDIInflow(t−1)) as a regressor in the models. FDI
inflow data exhibits a high degree of temporal correlation; investment levels in t− 1 are a powerful
predictor of levels in year t. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable aims to correct for this
temporal dependency.
Methodology
All models are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors
as a caution against heteroskedasticity. Moreover, to account for the time it takes for investors to
select a host and execute their investment decisions, I lag all independent variables by one year. This
also allows me to reduce the risk of endogeneity bias.
Results
Table 1 presents the results of the models used to test Hypothesis 1. The main variable of interest is
the interaction between Change in Leader Support and the squared term of Presidential Approval.
Overall, I estimate four equations based on different sets of control variables. I first estimate
the baseline model only with the main independent variables of interest along with the lagged
dependent variable and temporal controls. Next, I add control variables that captures targets’
51The correlation between Executive Constraints variable and a binary that captures whether or not a target state is a
democracy, using polity2 score of a 6 and above as the democracy threshold, is 0.89 in my dataset.
52The results remain the same when I use the regime durability variable coded by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2009),
accounting for the number of years the current regime has operated under the same institutional arrangement.
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economic characteristics that might influence firms’ investment decisions. I then add control variables
to account for U.S.-host government relations. Finally, I estimate a full equation with all control
variables, including the ones that capture targets’ political characteristics.
Table 4: The Effect of Assessed Likelihood of Policy Continuity on Net FDI Inflows in Target States
DV: Net FDI Inflow Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Change in Source of Leader Support -39.795** -43.164** -44.496** -48.285***
(13.01) (14.04) (13.65) (14.28)
Presidential Approval -0.505 -0.588* -0.504 -0.436
(0.27) (0.29) (0.28) (0.29)
SOLS Change x Presidential Approval 1.599** 1.752** 1.833*** 1.971***
(0.50) (0.54) (0.52) (0.54)
Presidential Approval2 0.005 0.005* 0.005 0.004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SOLS Change x Presidential Approval2 -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.020***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
FDI Inflowt−1 0.352*** 0.247*** 0.165*** 0.155***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Financial Openness 0.616*** 0.301* 0.332*
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
Population (ln) 0.455*** 0.282 0.302
(0.12) (0.17) (0.17)
Economic Growth 0.090* 0.117** 0.121**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
US Distance -0.000* -0.000**
(0.00) (0.00)
US Trade 0.636*** 0.643***
(0.14) (0.16)
Executive Constraints -0.002
(0.09)
Regime Durability -0.007
(0.01)
Count of Post-Sanctions Years 1.844 2.220 2.135 2.240
(1.38) (1.50) (1.45) (1.49)
Constant 13.262 6.892 4.287 2.163
(7.30) (7.90) (7.71) (7.96)
N 590 521 521 504
Adjusted R-squared 0.15 0.19 0.24 0.23
- Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
- Estimates are derived from an OLS model with robust standard errors.
- Temporal controls are omitted.
The coefficient estimate for Change in Source of Leader Support is negative and statistically
significant across all model specifications. This suggests that U.S. firms invest less in the target
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country following sanctions removal for the years in which the U.S. has a new president that belongs
a different political party than the leader who ended sanctions. Similarly, the coefficient estimates
for the interaction between the SOLS Change variable and Presidential Approval, as well as the
interaction between SOLS Change variable and the squared term of Presidential Approval are
statistically significant across all model specifications. However, the coefficients and their standard
errors presented in Table 1 are not informative to interpret the conditional and substantive effects of
the main variables of interest due to the inclusion of the three-way interaction term in the models.
Therefore, I calculate the marginal effects of Change in Leader Support across the observed range
of Presidential Approval. Figure 2 presents the marginal effects and the curvilinear relationship
between the presidential approval and the amount of foreign direct investment sent to target countries
from U.S. firms.
Figure 8: Predictive Margins - Interpreting the Three-way Interaction Term
The x-axis represents the observed range of the Presidential Approval variable, while the y-axis
represents the net FDI inflow into the target countries from the U.S. in the years following sanctions
removal. The blue line represents the results for the years in which the leader who ended sanctions
remains in power or the new leader who takes office is from the same political party as the predecessor
that ended sanctions. The red line represents the results for the years in which the U.S. has a new
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president that represents a different political party than the leader that ended sanctions in the years
following sanctions removal.
First, let me analyze the results for the cases where SOLS Change=0, presented by the blue line.
As expected, the flat line suggests that the levels of FDI inflow into the target countries does not
vary substantially by the approval ratings of the president and is always positive. In other words, if
the leader who ends sanctions continue to remain in office or a new leader that represents the same
political party takes the office of Presidency in the United States, this gives U.S. firms confidence
that sanctions will not recur.
The red line depicting the results for the cases where SOLS Change=1 demonstrates the curvilin-
ear effect proposed in Hypothesis 1. For the cases where Presidential Approval is very low or very
high, the net FDI inflow from U.S. firms into target countries are significantly lower than the inflow
from U.S. firms into target countries for the cases where SOLS Change=0.
Taken together, the results provide partial and preliminary support for Hypothesis 1; however,
the results are not very conclusive. For instance, the levels of presidential approval that depicts a
statistically significant difference between the cases where SOLS Change=0 and SOLS Change=1,
are outliers in the data. Moreover, the statistical difference for the lower levels of presidential
approval holds only for the very lower end of the spectrum. The future drafts of this chapter will aim
to improve the statistical test in order to obtain more robust support for the hypothesis. My plans
about how I can achieve this goal are outlined in the concluding section of this chapter.
Table 2 presents the results to test Hypothesis 2. The main variable of interests is Decisive Final
Outcome. Similar to the analysis presented in Table 1, the control variables are introduced on top
of the baseline model in steps in each model. Across all four equations, I find that when economic
sanctions end with complete target acquiescence or sender capitulation, the target attracts higher
levels of FDI from U.S. firms, compared to cases that end with only partial concessions by the target,
a negotiated settlement, or a stalemate. Moreover, when we compare the size of the coefficient
estimate of the Decisive Final Outcome with the coefficient estimates of all other control variables
that are known to be associated to attract FDI, we see that the coefficient estimates of the Decisive
Final Outcome variable is the largest, indicating a larger substantive effect on the net inflow into
target states from the United States.
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Table 5: The Effect of Sanctions Outcome on Net FDI Inflows in Target States
DV: Net FDI Inflow Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Decisive Final Outcome 1.105** 1.135** 1.177** 1.060*
(0.37) (0.40) (0.40) (0.41)
FDI Inflowt−1 0.328*** 0.221*** 0.165*** 0.149**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Financial Openness 0.607*** 0.324* 0.406*
(0.14) (0.16) (0.17)
Population (ln) 0.491*** 0.394* 0.414*
(0.13) (0.18) (0.18)
Economic Growth 0.083 0.104* 0.106*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
US Distance -0.000** -0.000*
(0.00) (0.00)
US Trade 0.445** 0.478**
(0.15) (0.16)
Executive Constraint -0.006
(0.10)
Regime Durability -0.012
(0.01)
Count of Post-Sanctions Years 1.299 1.731 1.739 1.872
(1.43) (1.53) (1.50) (1.54)
Constant 0.417 -8.878** -9.421** -9.796**
(2.31) (3.26) (3.34) (3.44)
N 542 483 483 467
R-squared 0.13 0.18 0.21 0.20
- Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
- Estimates are derived from an OLS model with robust standard errors.
- Temporal controls are omitted.
71
Figure 3 presents the finding visually. While the x-axis presents the range of the binary variable
Decisive Final Outcome variable, the y-axis represents the predictions for the net FDI inflow into
target countries, holding all other control variables at their means. The bar on the left portrays the
results for the cases that ended with partial target concessions, negotiated settlement, or a stalemate;
whereas the bar on the right portrays the results for the cases that ended with complete target
consessions or sender capitulation. The difference between the heights of the two bars is equal to the
coefficient estimate for Decisive Final Outcome presented in Table 5.
Figure 9: Predictive Margins - Decisive Final Outcome
Lastly, assessing the control variable provides additional insights on the determinants of FDI
inflow into countries previously targeted with economic sanctions. The findings for most of the
control variables that capture the macroeconomic conditions in the target state and the economic
incentives they can offer to firms are in line with the existing literature on FDIs. Target countries
that are more financially open, have a relatively large population, and grows economically attract
more FDI than the target countries that have a relatively closed financial system, smaller population
size, and experience an economic stagnation. Similarly, targets that are geographically closer to the
United States and targets that have higher levels of trade with the U.S. following sanctions removal
are more desirable locations for FDI for U.S. firms.
The variables that capture the political characteristics of the sender, however; do not achieve
statistical significance. This is not surprising given the conflicting theories and incongruous findings
in the literature about the impact of regime type and regime stability on FDI inflows. Some scholars
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argue that democracy promotes FDI due to their stability, transparency or lower changes of conflict.
However, some other scholars argue that democracy can increase political risk for private firms due
to the frequent change in government via normal elections, the ability of competing interest groups
to influence government policy or higher labor or environmental standards.53 Therefore, I conclude
that Executive Constraints and Regime Durability variables are not significant determinants of the
level of investment by U.S. firms in target countries.
Conclusion and Future Directions
Targets of economic sanctions might benefit from an increasing flow of foreign investment in the
aftermath of sanctions removal; yet, they may struggle to signal to potential investors that their
long-term investments will be secure. In this chapter, I argue that firms find it risky to invest in
countries shortly after sanctions end due to the perceived risk of sanctions recurrence. I suggest that
firms base their investment decisions on two main indicators. First, they observe the domestic politics
of their home governments closely to gauge the likelihood foreign policy continuity. I argue that the
most important domestic factor that gives confidence to firms is whether or not the leader who ended
sanctions, or a new president that shares his predecessor’s foreign policy views is in power. For the
cases where the a new societal coalition becomes influential in the home country, firms observe the
level of public support the new leader gets and assess the ability of the new leader to reverse his
predecessor’s policies. In addition to these domestic factors, firms also observe how sanctions ended,
and look for a definitive outcome as an assurance.
Even if the findings presented above lends some support for these expectations, they are not
conclusive and robust. Future work is needed to strengthen the empirical analysis and produce more
robust and generalizable results. The first next step to build on this chapter is to use more fine-grained
FDI data that is better suited to test the theory presented in this chapter. The theoretical discussion
presented above, and the subsequent empirical test, including the measurement of the dependent
variable, are based on an assumption that is widely common in the FDI literature: FDI is a risky
form of investment due to its low exit mobility, high sunk-costs, and long-term nature. However,
FDI activities vary significantly based on the resource commitments of parent firms, level of control,
53See Franzese (2002) for a review of the literature on regime type and FDI.
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liquidity, and their exit mobility. For instance, mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, and greenfield
investments are often lumped together in the same FDI measure. However, the logic of investing is
different for short term (non-fixed) vs. long-term (fixed) assets (Kerner, 2014; Kerner and Lawrence,
2014). Thus, firms’ risk assessments might be different for different forms of investments due to
their varying level of mobility and liquidity (Lee, Biglaiser and Staats, 2014).
The theory presented in this chapter is only applicable to forms of investment that are associated
with sunk costs, lower mobility, and lower liquidity. Specially, an examination of plant, property
and equipment investments of U.S. MNCs abroad, such as the value of physical structures, land,
machinery, equipment, and the book value of land, timber, mineral and similar rights owned by
the foreign affiliates. This information is available through the BEA; however, it is not structured
bilaterally. I aim to use a more nuanced FDI data for future versions of this chapter to better match
the theory.
Next, the temporal dynamics of the theory needs to be better tested. For instance, I expect the
perception of risk to fade as time relapses with no sanctions recurrence and to drastically heighten
with threat of imposition of new sanctions. More theory development is required to capture the
dynamism in the process outlined in this chapter, and a well thought research design to model this
process.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
When and how do economic sanctions end? What are the political, economic, and domestic
consequences of ending sanctions? This dissertation answers these two questions in three empirical
chapters. First, I examine the conditions under which sanctions end. Next, I identify the post-
sanctions environment characteristics conducive to sanctions recurrence. Lastly, I analyze firms’
investment decisions into countries previously targeted with economic sanctions and identify the
conditions under which foreign direct investment inflow to target countries increases following
sanctions removal.
This concluding chapter proceeds as follows. The next three subsections summarize the theories
and findings presented in each empirical chapter. I discuss the results from individual sections, the
theoretical and practical importance of these results, and my future research ideas to extend the work
from each chapter. I end this section with a discussion of the contributions of this project as a whole
to the sanctions literature and a couple concluding remarks.
When Do Sanctions End?
Chapter 2 theorizes about the process through which sanctions end. I argue that ending economic
coercion is profitable for senders, yet potentially risky. Using a game theoretic model, I identify
that the imposers of sanctions are often uncertain whether their targets will channel the gains from
sanctions relief into their offensive behavior. I show that senders can be willing to risk ending
sanctions only if they are confident that targets will not take advantage of peace by posing new
security threats. I empirically show that effective international monitoring and attractive economic
inducements enable senders to take the risk of economic peace and lift sanctions.
These findings have a few implications for both scholars and practitioners of economic sanc-
tions. First, instead of cutting political ties with target countries, senders should keep investing
in international and bilateral political channels to communicate with their targets. Senders often
recall ambassadors and limit bilateral and multilateral talks with their targets while sanctions are
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in place. However, in Chapter 2, I show that dense information flow between senders and targets
facilitate sanctions removal, ensure target compliance, and enable sender to accurately differentiate
between sincere and insincere targets during sanctions removal negotiations. Therefore, senders need
to devise mechanisms for continued communication and diplomacy with their targets, bilaterally and
multilaterally.
Second, the findings suggest that dense information flow between senders and targets facilitates
sanctions removal only if it is complemented with attractive economic inducements. From a policy
perspective, being able to propose an attractive sanctions relief package is a function of being able to
harm the target’s economy in the first place. The research suggests that “smart” sanctions, sanctions
that are designed to focus their impact on leaders, political elites, or segments of society believed
responsible for objectionable behavior (Weiss, 1999; Cortright and Lopez, 2002), can perform
better at harming the target so that the proposed sanctions relief can be attractive during sanctions
negotiations. Similarly, more recent scholarly and policy discussions on sanctions’ ability to impose
costs on the target country have started to revolve around financial sanctions. Even if the theoretical
and empirical literature on financial sanctions is limited, the recent cases has demonstrated the
growing effectiveness of financial sanctions. Therefore, smart sanctions and financial sanctions, in
other words, sanctions that have a bite, coupled with dense information flow between senders and
targets, can be the recipe for successful sanctions removal negotiations.
I plan to extend the work from this chapter in a number of ways. Mainly, I aim to focus more
explicitly on the negotiation process by analyzing the conditions under which negotiations take place
and negotiations succeed. Around 40 percent of all economic sanctions imposed between years
1945 and 2005 end with a negotiated settlement, however, the TIES dataset, the most comprehensive
dataset available on economic sanctions, only report negotiations that succeed. I intend to gather new
data on diplomatic exchanges and negotiation attempts between senders and targets over the course
of a sanctions episode and include failed negotiations as well. This new data will allow me to answer
interesting questions about when negotiations begin, when they succeed, and how long does it take
for success to be achieved.
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When Do Sanctions Recur?
Chapter 3 presents a theory about the economic and domestic consequences of sanctions removal and
proposes two competing hypotheses about the post-sanctions environment conducive to sanctions
recurrence. The first hypothesis suggests that economic sanctions recur if the target takes advantage
of sanctions relief and poses new security threats following sanctions removal. The alternative
hypothesis suggests that sanctions recurrence is often not a response to the target’s behavior, but is
primarily driven by domestic politics of the sender country. I find support for the latter hypothesis
and empirically show that sanctions are more likely to recur if the leader changes in the sender
country following sanctions removal and a different domestic coalition becomes influential.
The work from the third chapter can be extended in a number of ways. First, future work can
empirically distinguish between the underlying causal mechanisms of sanctions imposition and
sanctions recurrence. In the theory section of the chapter, I theorize about how the decision to end
sanctions alter the environment in which senders and targets interact in the aftermath of sanctions
removal. Therefore, the theory assumes that the initial onset of sanctions and their recurrence are
theoretically distinct. This theoretical assumption can be tested empirically.
Second, target behavior in the long-run needs to be examined. The existing literature on sanctions
effectiveness conceptualizes “success” as partial or full acquiescence by the target country to the
sender’s demands at the time of termination. However, the question about whether sanctions remain
to be effective in the long-run is an important question yet to be answered. I propose an alternative
conceptualization of sanctions effectiveness. I argue that sanctions are effective only if the target
continues to be in compliance with the senders’ demands in the long-run, and while having access to
sanctions relief. This is a higher bar for success; however, taking target behavior only at the time of
termination into consideration might lead to overestimation of sanctions success in the literature.
How Do Firms React to Sanctions Removal?
The last piece of the dissertation continues to examine the aftermath of sanctions removal; however
from the perspective of private firms. I argue that economies that were previously targeted with
sanctions can be lucrative investment opportunities for the MNCs of the sender country; however,
they are also risky investments due to the potential of sanctions recurrence. I show that firms
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seek credible assurances both from their home government (the sender) and host governments (the
target) that sanctions will not recur and their investments will be safe in the long-run. Specifically, I
demonstrate that foreign direct investment inflow into the target country following sanctions removal
if the sender government signals foreign policy continuity and if the sanctions episode ended with a
definite outcome, such as capitulation by the sender or complete acquiescence by the target.
The work presented in Chapter 4 needs further theory development and improvements in the
statistical tests. Most importantly, I need to have a more nuanced theory and empirical test by
differentiating between types of FDI. Specifically, the theory should be tailored towards the types of
investment with relatively limited mobility and liquidity, as opposed to the forms of investments that
are not necessarily sunk costs for the investors. The empirical test should also utilize measures that
only captures those assets.
This research also opens the door to future research on economic recovery, an area of interest
for both sanctions scholars and practitioners. Foreign direct investment is only one of the many
sources of economic recovery for the target countries. Increasing ability to access to international
borrowing, participation in bilateral or international trade deals or increase in foreign aid are other
potential sources of economic recovery for the targets of economic sanctions and I intend to continue
to explore questions related to the consequences of sanctions removal in the target country.
Concluding Remarks
In addition to the theories and findings presented in each chapter, this dissertation as a whole provides
several contributions to the economic sanctions literature. First, this project adopts a previously
missing theoretical framework to answer the question of “when sanctions end” and analyzes the
process through which sanctions are lifted, rather than just the outcome of sanctions episodes. Second,
it opens a door to a future research agenda that examines the economic, domestic, and political
implications of sanctions removal in both the sender and the target states, as well as sender-target
relations following sanctions removal. Our theories about the sanctioning process, as well as the
research designs utilized to understand the sanctioning process often end with sanctions termination.
In this project, I highlight the importance of considering the post-sanctions period as an integral
part of the sanctioning process and propose a new avenue for research. Post-sanctions economy
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recovery, the extent of political normalization between senders and targets, long-term effectiveness of
economic sanctions, and target recidivism are only a few of the many areas that scholars can examine
in the future by building on the theoretical framework and the findings presented in this dissertation.
Second, this dissertation attempt to bridge the gap between the two strains of research in
economic sanctions literature: the bargaining framework of economic sanctions and the domestic
explanations of economic sanctions. These two theoretical frameworks, referenced throughout the
dissertation, are often viewed as competing explanations of economic sanctions. In this project, I
often conceptualized the two theories as complementary. I adopt a bargaining framework to model
the strategic interaction between senders and targets, while also accounting for domestic drivers and
implications of economic sanctions. More future work is needed to theorize about how the bargaining
framework of economic sanctions and an in depth analysis of domestic factors at play in sanctions
onset, effectiveness, termination, and the consequences of lifting sanctions.
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APPENDIX A: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 2
Supplementary Mathematical Appendix for Chapter 2
The game is solved using the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) Solution concept, which specifies
that the players’ strategies are sequentially rational given their beliefs, which are calculated using
Bayes’ Rule. The game consists of two players: a sender (S) and two types of target (T1, T2). Nature
draws T1 with probability Ω and T2 with probability (1 − Ω). T1 receives 0 for both keeping and
reversing its offensive behavior. T2 receives 1 for keeping its offensive policy and 0 for reversing it.
The sequence of moves is as follows:
1. Nature draws either T1 or T2.
2. Both T decide to Negotiate zor ∼ Negotiate.
3. If T plays Negotiate, S plays Deal or ∼ Deal.
4. If S plays Deal, T plays Comply or ∼ Comply.
T’s Final Move
Lemma 1: T1 Comply if θ > 12 .
Proof:
EUT1(Comply) = θ(x− ) + (1− θ)(−βT cT − )
EUT1(∼ Comply) = θ(−βT cT − ) + (1− θ)(x− )
T1 Comply if θ(x− ) + (1− θ)(−βT cT − ) > θ(−βT cT − ) + (1− θ)(x− ). Simplifying in
terms of θ:
θ >
1
2
= θˆT1 (i)
If θ = 12 , EUT1(Comply) = EUT2(∼ Comply). I assume that T1 plays Comply in case of an
indifference. This assumption makes the solution more coherent by eliminating redundant equilibria.
However, relaxing it does not change the implications of the model.
Lemma 2: T2 Comply if θ > 12 +
1
2(βT cT+x)
.
80
Proof:
EUT2(Comply) = θ(x− ) + (1− θ)(−βT cT − )
EUT2(∼ Comply) = θ(1− βT cT − ) + (1− θ)(1 + x− )
T2 Comply if θ(x− ) + (1− θ)(−βT cT − ) > θ(1−βT cT − ) + (1− θ)(1 +x− ). Simplifying
in terms of θ:
θ >
1
2
+
1
2(βT cT + x)
= θˆT2 (ii)
• θˆT2 > θˆT1
Now I will examine the three different cases based on different levels of θ:
1. θ < θT1
2. θT1 < θ < θˆT2
3. θ > θˆT2
Case 1: Low Information Flow between S and T (θ < θˆT1)
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 establish that if θ < θˆT1, both T1 and T2 will play ∼ Comply.
Lemma 3: S play Deal if cS > (1−θ)(a−x)1−θβcs
Proof:
EUS(∼ Deal) = (−cS)
EUS(Deal) = θ(−βScS) + (1− θ)(x− a)
S plays Deal if cs >
(1−θ)(a−x)
1−θβScS .
If θ < θˆT1 and cs >
(1−θ)(a−x)
1−θβScS , the following beliefs and strategies constitute a pooling Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium:
1. T1 : { ∼ Comply}
2. T2 : {∼ Comply}
3. S: Deal
4. Beliefs: Pr {Ω| Negotiate } = 1
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In these cases, S will Deal despite T’s non-compliance, and both Ts will Negotiate in their first
moves.
If θ < θˆT1 and cs <
(1−θ)(a−x)
1−θβScS , the following beliefs and strategies constitute a pooling Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium:
1. T1 : { ∼ Comply}
2. T2 : {∼ Comply}
3. S: ∼ Deal
4. Beliefs: Pr {Ω| ∼ Negotiate } = 1
In these cases, S will play ∼ Deal, and both Ts will ∼ Negotiate in their first moves.
Case 2: Weak Information Flow between S and T (θˆT1 < θ < θˆT2)
θT1 < θ < θˆT2 → T1, T2 : {Comply,∼ Comply}
Lemma 1 and 2 establish that T1 will play Comply and T2 will play ∼ Comply.
Lemma 4: S plays Deal if θ > Ω(βScS+x−a)−cS−x−aΩ(2+2βScS+x−a)+1−βScS−x−a
Proof:
EUS(∼ Deal) = −cS
EUS(Deal) = Ω[θ(1 + x) + (1− θ)(1− βScS)] + (1− Ω)[θ(−βScS) + (1− θ)(x− a)]
S will Deal if EUS(Deal) > EUS(∼ Deal)
Simplifying in terms of θ:
θ >
Ω(βScS + x− a)− cS − x− a
Ω(2 + 2βScS + x− a) + 1− βScS − x− a (iii)
If Equation iii is not satisfied, S plays ∼ Deal and keep sanctions. If this is the case, a separating
equilibrium forms where T1 play Negotiate, while T2 play ∼ Negotiate.
For Equation iii to be satisfied, θ needs to be within the range of [12 ,
1
2 +
1
2(βT cT+x)
]
For the above range to exist, the following condition needs to be satisfied:
βT cT + x+ 1
2(βT cT + x)
− Ω(βScS + x− a)− cS − x− a
Ω(2 + 2βScS + x− a) + 1− βScS − x− a > 0 (5)
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Using comparative statics, we can observe whether the range is shrinking or expanding with
respect to an increase in a given variable. I
Comparative statics with respect to Ω:
∂u
∂Ω > 0→ we can conclude that the probability that S plays Deal increases for higher values of
Ω, for the cases where θˆT1 < θ < θˆT2.
Comparative statics with respect to a:
∂u
∂a < 0→ we can conclude that the probability that S plays Deal decreases for higher values of a,
for the cases where θˆT1 < θ < θˆT2.
Case 3: Dense Information Flow between S and T (θ > 12 +
1
2(βT cT+x)
)
Lemma 1 and 2 establish that both Ts play Comply if θ > ˆθT2
Lemma 6: S always plays Deal.
Proof:
EUS(∼ Deal) = −cS
EUS(Deal) = θ(1 + x) + (1− θ)(1− βScS)
S Deal if EUS(Deal) > EUS(∼ Deal)
This will always be true.
Consider the pooling equilibrium, where both T1, T2: {Negotiate,Negotiate}
EUT1(Negotiate) = θ(x− ) + (1− θ)(−βT cT − )
EUT1(∼ Negotiate) = −cT
T1 has no incentive to deviate if EUT1(Negotiate) > EUT1(∼ Negotiate)
T1 will play Negotiate if:
x >
(1− θ)(βT cT ) + − cT
θ
= xˆT1 (6)
EUT2(Negotiate) = (θ)(x− ) + (1− θ)(−βT cT − )
EUT2(∼ Negotiate) = 1− cT
EUT2(Negotiate) > EUT2(∼ Negotiate) if:
x >
1 + βT cT − θβT cT + − cT
θ
= xˆT1 (7)
• xˆT1 < xˆT2
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Proposition 1: When the information flow between S and T is dense (θ > 12 +
1
2(βT cT+x)
)
sanctions are lifted and the following strategies and beliefs constitute a pooling Bayesian equilibrium,
only if x > 1+βT cT−θβT cT+−cTθ = xˆT2
1. T1: Negotiate, Comply
2. T2: Negotiate, Comply
3. Sender: Deal
4. Beliefs: Pr[Ω|Negotiate] = Ω
Proposition 2: When the information flow between S and T is dense (θ > 12 +
1
2(βT cT+x)
), the
following strategies and beliefs constitute a separating Bayesian equilibrium, only if xˆT1 < x < xˆT2
1. T1: Negotiate, Comply
2. T2: ∼ Negotiate, Comply
3. Sender: Deal
4. Beliefs: Pr[Ω|Negotiate] = 1 & Pr[Ω| ∼ Negotiate] = Ω
Proposition 3: When the information flow between S and T is dense (θ > 12 +
1
2(βT cT+x)
), the
following strategies and beliefs constitute a pooling Bayesian equilibrium, only if x < xˆT1
1. T1: ∼ Negotiate, Comply
2. T2: ∼ Negotiate, Comply
3. Sender: Deal
4. Beliefs: Pr[Ω|Negotiate] = 1 & Pr[Ω| ∼ Negotiate] = 0
Empirical Implication: Dense information flow between S and T (higher levels of θ) facilitates
sanctions removal, only if expected benefits of resumed economic interactions (x) are high. If the
expected economic benefits are not high, the targets will select out and quit at their first nodes. If it
is high, they move forward with the sanctions removal process and dense information flows induce
compliance and facilitates sanctions removal.
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Supplementary Empirical Appendix for Chapter 2
This section presents additional descriptive statistics and robustness checks for Chapter 2. First,
Table A.1 presents the same results as Table 2 (the main results table in the Chapter 2), with the
inclusion of the temporal controls that were omitted for brevity.
Table A.1: Probit: Sanctions Removal
M1: Baseline M2: Full Model
Joint IGO Membership 0.015** 0.021***
(0.00) (0.01)
∆ in T’s Trade Volume 0.125*** 0.138***
(0.03) (0.04)
Joint IGO Membership x ∆ in T’s Trade Volume -0.002* -0.003**
(0.00) (0.00)
Trade Dependence -0.750*
(0.37)
Multiple Issues -0.231*
(0.11)
Multiple Senders -0.005
(0.12)
Foreign Policy Similarity 0.180
(0.13)
GDP Ratio (per capita) 0.196
(0.35)
Time 0.109** 0.167***
(0.04) (0.05)
Time Squared -0.008** -0.013***
(0.00) (0.00)
Time Cubed 0.000** 0.000***
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant -1.761*** -2.109***
(0.20) (0.56)
N 1083 795
Log L -413.5 -308.9
- Estimates are derived from a probit model with robust s.e. clustered on the target state (in parenthesis).
- Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Next, Figure A.1 portrays the histogram of the Joint IGO Membership variable.
Figure A.1: Histogram of Joint IGO Membership Variable
Accounting for Sanctions Episodes with Missing End Dates
There are 29 cases in my dataset for which the TIES dataset does not provide an end date. I employ
two different coding decisions to account for these cases. First, I include all sanction years between
the imposition year and the year after the “ongoing as of” year and code the dependent variable as 1
for the year after the last recorded incident. Findings obtained through the this strategy are presented
in Chapter 2. Second, I include all sanction years between the imposition year and the year after the
“ongoing as of” year and code the dependent variable as 1 for the last year of the episode, and the
results are provided in Table 2 in Chapter 2. They are very similar to the findings presented in the
chapter and suggest that the results are not sensitive to how these 29 cases are treated.
Accounting for Episodes that Last Less than a Year
There are 77 episodes in my dataset that were imposed and lifted on the same year. To ensure that
these short-lived are not biasing the results by blurring the differentiation between imposition and
removal, Table A.3 presents the results from a sample where such cases are included to the analysis.
The number of unique sanctions episodes analyzed increases from 232 to 309. Model 1 employs the
same dependent variable employed in the paper, and Model 2 employs the dependent variable that
codes the dependent variable as 0 for the cases with no recorded end date.
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Table A.2: Probit: Sanctions Removal-Accounting for Sanctions with Recorded End Dates
M1: Baseline M2: Full Model
Joint IGO Membership 0.013** 0.020**
(0.00) (0.01)
∆ in T’s Trade Volume 0.113*** 0.122***
(0.03) (0.04)
Joint IGO Membership x ∆ in T’s Trade Volume -0.002* -0.002*
(0.00) (0.00)
Trade Dependence -0.810*
(0.39)
Foreign Policy Similarity 0.111
(0.12)
Multiple Issues -0.155
(0.11)
Multiple Senders 0.059
(0.12)
GDP Ratio (per capita) 0.057
(0.38)
Constant -1.458*** -1.642**
(0.18) (0.59)
Number of Observations 1083 795
Log L -393.0 -299.0
- Robust s.e are in paranthesis. Estimates are derived from a probit model with s.e. clustered on the target state.
- Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
- Temporal controls are omitted.
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Table A.3: Probit: Sanctions Removal-Accounting for Short-Lived Episodes
Model 1 Model 2
Joint IGO Membership 0.013* 0.015*
(0.01) (0.01)
∆ in T’s Trade Volume 0.093** 0.089*
(0.04) (0.04)
Joint IGO Membership x ∆ in T’s Trade Volume -0.002* -0.002*
(0.00) (0.00)
Trade Dependence -0.843* -0.913*
(0.35) (0.36)
Foreign Policy Similarity 0.178 0.135
(0.12) (0.12)
Multiple Issues -0.239* -0.181
(0.10) (0.11)
Multiple Senders -0.123 -0.049
(0.11) (0.12)
GDP Ratio (per capita) -0.022 -0.140
(0.31) (0.33)
Constant -0.851 -0.702
(0.51) (0.52)
Number of Observations 838 838
Log L -377.7 -362.1
- Robust standard errors are in paranthesis. Estimates are derived from a probit model with s.e.
clustered on the target state.
- Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
- Temporal controls are omitted.
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Rare Events Logistic Regression
Next, I re-ran the main analysis using rare event logistic model, using the Relogit package in Stata.
85% of the binary dependent is 0 and King and Zeng (2001) show that high numbers of “non-events”
can underestimate the probability of rare events and might lead to errors in coefficients and their
standard errors. Table A.4 shows that the results of the probit model presented in the main paper are
not driven by the high frequency of 0s in the dependent variable, as the results remain the same.
Table A.4: Rare Events Logistic Regression: Sanctions Removal
Model
Joint IGO Membership 0.036**
(0.01)
∆ in T’s Trade Volume 0.223**
(0.07)
Joint IGO Membership x ∆ in T’s Trade Volume -0.004*
(0.00)
Trade Dependence -1.234
(0.69)
Multiple Issues -0.415*
(0.18)
Multiple Sender 0.005
(0.21)
Foreign Policy Similarity 0.325
(0.22)
GDP Ratio (per capita) 0.343
(0.61)
Time 0.323***
(0.09)
Time-Squared -0.025***
(0.01)
Time-Cubed 0.000***
(0.00)
Constant -3.647***
(1.03)
Number of Observations 795
- Estimates are derived from a rare events logistic model with standard errors clustered on the target state.
- Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Accounting for Time Dependence
To account for the time dependence, I use cubic polynomial approximation method proposed by
Carter and Signorino (2010).54 However, Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998) offer an alternative strategy
to model time dependence in binary data by incorporating splined time in binary time series cross
sectional samples. Table A.5 replicates the main results with the inclusion of splined times as
regressors. The results are not sensitive to how time dependence in is treated. Model 1 employs the
same dependent variable employed in Chapter 2, and Model 2 employs the dependent variable that
codes the dependent variable as 0 for the cases with no recorded end date.
Sample Restricted to Minor cS Cases
The solution of the game theoretic model presented in Chapter 2 reveals that there are some cases
in which the sender prefers to end sanctions, even if the target is known to be opportunistic and is
expected to keep pursuing its offensive behavior. If the costs of sanctions, cS , is high for the sender,
it has an incentive to end sanctions to avoid causing further harm to its own economy, and its decision
to end sanctions is not necessarily based on the target’s compliance. I subject my empirical analysis
to a harder test by limiting the dataset to the cases where the costs of sanctions are only minor to the
sender. This is a harder test, since the sample is limited to the cases where bargaining problems need
to be solved to end sanctions. TIES Dataset codes “Sender Economic Costs” as minor (1), major (2),
and severe (3) and I re-ran the main analysis by restricting the sample to the cases where “Sender
Economic Costs” is coded as 1. The results are presented in Table A.6. Model 1 employs the same
dependent variable employed in the paper, and Model 2 employs the dependent variable that codes
the dependent variable as 0 for the cases with no recorded end date.
54I use the btscs package in Stata.
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Table A.5: Probit: Sanction Removal - with the Inclusion of Splines
Model 1 Model 2
Joint IGO Membership 0.018** 0.020**
(0.01) (0.01)
∆ in T’s Trade Volume 0.122*** 0.129***
(0.04) (0.04)
Joint IGO Membership x ∆ in T’s Trade Volume -0.002* -0.003*
(0.00) (0.00)
Trade Dependence -0.774* -0.798*
(0.34) (0.36)
Foreign Policy Similarity 0.163 0.141
(0.12) (0.12)
Multiple Issues -0.198* -0.142
(0.10) (0.11)
Multiple Senders -0.010 0.092
(0.11) (0.12)
GDP Ratio (per capita) 0.244 0.017
(0.32) (0.39)
Time Until Removal 0.758*** 0.562***
(0.21) (0.15)
Spline 1 0.182** 0.082**
(0.06) (0.03)
Spline 2 -0.072** -0.023**
(0.03) (0.01)
Spline 3 0.006 0.001
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant -2.122*** -1.992***
(0.56) (0.60)
Number of Observations 795 795
Log L -308.2 -292.8
- Estimates are derived from a probit model with robust s.e. clustered on the target state.
- Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (Temporal controls are omitted)
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Table A.6: Probit: Sanctions Removal - Minor cS Cases
Model 1 Model 2
Joint IGO Membership 0.019** 0.020**
(0.01) (0.01)
∆ in T’s Trade Volume 0.126* 0.123*
(0.05) (0.05)
Joint IGO Membership x ∆ in T’s Trade Volume -0.003* -0.003*
(0.00) (0.00)
Trade Dependence -0.746* -0.715
(0.38) (0.38)
Foreign Policy Similarity 0.237 0.207
(0.13) (0.13)
Multiple Issues -0.183 -0.092
(0.11) (0.12)
Multiple Senders -0.015 0.077
(0.13) (0.13)
GDP Ratio (per capita) 0.096 -0.173
(0.42) (0.48)
Time 0.192*** 0.210***
(0.05) (0.06)
Time Squared -0.014*** -0.015***
(0.00) (0.00)
Time Cubed 0.000*** 0.000**
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant -2.006** -1.855**
(0.66) (0.72)
Number of Observations 708 708
- Estimates are derived from a probit model with robust s.e. clustered on the target state.
- Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Accounting for Global Trade Trends
Table A.7 replicates the main model by using an alternative operationalization of the attractiveness of
sanctions relief. To ensure that the results are not driven by the increases in global trade levels over
time, I adjusted the ∆ in T’s Trade Volume variable by calculating the difference between the change
in target’s trade volume over the course of a sanctions episode and the changes in the mean of global
trade in the same time period. For both calculations, I used the year before the sanctions imposition
as the baseline. Positive values indicate that the change in T’s total trade volume compared to the
year before sanctions were imposed is higher than the change in the mean of the global trade. Using
this new operationalization does not alter the results. I find that the probability of sanctions removal
is higher if there is dense information flow between senders and targets. And this effect diminishes
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as the target’s trade increases under sanctions more than the global trade does. Model 1 employs the
same dependent variable employed in Chapter 2, and Model 2 employs the dependent variable that
codes the dependent variable as 0 for the cases with no recorded end date.
Table A.7: Probit: Sanctions Removal-Global Trade Trends
Model 1 Model 2
Joint IGO Membership 0.021*** 0.022***
(0.01) (0.01)
∆ in T’s Trade - Global Trade Adjusted 1.415*** 1.462***
(0.36) (0.37)
Joint IGO x ∆ in T’s Trade - Global Trade Adjusted -0.029** -0.032**
(0.01) (0.01)
Trade Dependence -0.803* -0.767*
(0.37) (0.36)
Multiple Issues -0.232* -0.162
(0.10) (0.11)
Multiple Senders -0.012 0.079
(0.12) (0.13)
Foreign Policy Similarity 0.164 0.126
(0.12) (0.13)
GDP Ratio (per capita) 0.250 0.057
(0.36) (0.42)
Time 0.175*** 0.182***
(0.05) (0.05)
Time Squared -0.013*** -0.014**
(0.00) (0.00)
Time Cubed 0.000*** 0.000**
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant -2.139*** -2.078***
(0.57) (0.62)
Number of Observations 795 795
Log L -309.1 -292.4
- Estimates are derived from a probit model with robuts s.e. clustered on the target state.
- Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Examining Outliers
As expected, the number of cases in which target’s trade volume grows drastically under sanctions is
rare. To ensure that the distribution of the ∆ in T’s Trade Change variable is not driving the results,
I identify the extreme values of the variable and run the models excluding the cases.55 Model 1
55I looked at the highest 1 percent of the data, and dropped the cases where ∆ in T’s Trade Change¿18.
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in Table A.8 employs the same dependent variable employed in Chapter 2. Model 2 employs the
dependent variable that codes the dependent variable as 0 for the cases with no recorded end dates.
Model 3 includes the cases where the imposition year and the removal are the same.
Table A.8: Probit: Sanctions Removal
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Joint IGO Membership 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.013*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆ in T’s Trade Volume 0.199** 0.208** 0.154**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05)
Joint IGO Membership x ∆ in T’s Trade Volume -0.004* -0.004** -0.003**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trade Dependence -0.715 -0.676 -0.850*
(0.37) (0.36) (0.35)
Foreign Policy Similarity 0.164 0.125 0.152
(0.13) (0.13) (0.11)
Multiple Issues -0.243* -0.174 -0.242*
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10)
Multiple Senders -0.000 0.092 -0.103
(0.12) (0.13) (0.11)
GDP Ratio (per capita) 0.235 0.050 0.038
(0.35) (0.41) (0.28)
Number of Observations 792 792 835
Log L -306.6 -289.8 -373.7
- Estimates are derived from a probit model with robust s.e (in paranthesis) clustered on the target.
- Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (Temporal controls are omitted.)
Additionally, I identified the observations with high residuals and check if the high residual
observations have also high leverage. Figure A.2 presents the leverage vs. residual squared plot. It
is sorted by the caseid variable - a unique identifier for each sanctions episode. Points above the
horizontal line have higher than average leverage and points to the right of the vertical line have larger
than average residuals. For instance episode with the caseid 1952010802 has a very high residual
(i.e the difference between the predicted and observed value), but it does not have much leverage;
therefore, it is not of concern. However, the cases with large residuals that also have high leverage
might be problematic, such as the case 2000122002. Dropping this high residual-high leverage case
does not alter the results.
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Figure A.2: Leverage vs. Residual Squared Plot
Table A.9: Probit: Sanctions Removal - High Residual/High Leverage Case Dropped
Model
Joint IGO Membership 0.022***
(0.01)
∆ in T’s Trade Volume 0.189**
(0.07)
Joint IGO Memberhship x ∆ in T’s Trade Volume -0.004*
(0.00)
Trade Dependence -0.724*
(0.37)
Multiple Issues -0.240*
(0.11)
Multiple Senders -0.001
(0.12)
Foreign Policy Similarity 0.171
(0.13)
GDP Ratio (per capita) 0.238
(0.35)
Constant -2.183***
(0.57)
Number of Observations 793
- Estimates are derived from a probit model with robust s.e (in paranthesis) clustered on the target.
- Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (Temporal controls are omitted.)
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Duration Analysis
Lastly, I re-ran the main analysis using Cox Proportional Hazard Regression model. Since Cox
models does not assume a particular distribution for the dependent variable and the nature of the
hazard function, I prefer it over alternative duration model specifications. Utilizing a Cox model
further allows me to model time dependence in the data, in addition to using cubic polynomial
approximation and cubic splines employed in the probit model. Table A.10 presents coefficient
estimates for each covariate added to the Cox model. Model 1 employs the same dependent variable
employed in the paper, and Model 2 employs the dependent variable that codes the dependent variable
as 0 for the cases with no recorded end date.
Table A.10: Cox Proportional Hazard Regression: Duration until Sanctions End
Cox Model 1 Cox Model 2
Joint IGO Membership 0.029** 0.033***
(0.01) (0.01)
∆ in T’s Trade Volume 0.231*** 0.233***
(0.05) (0.06)
Joint IGO Membership x ∆ in T’s Trade Volume -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.00) (0.00)
Trade Dependence -0.836 -0.860
(0.57) (0.58)
Multiple Senders 0.037 0.167
(0.17) (0.18)
Multiple Issues -0.343* -0.269
(0.14) (0.15)
Foreign Policy Similarity 0.315 0.246
(0.18) (0.19)
GDP Ratio (per capita) 0.176 -0.060
(0.50) (0.60)
Number of Observations 795 795
- Robust standard errors are in paranthesis. Coefficient estimates are derived from cox proportional hazard
model with standard errors clustered on the target state.
- ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
To interpret the results visually, Figure A.3 plots the predicted survival rates for two separate
cases. The plot on the left portrays the survival of sanctions episodes, holding institutional connect-
edness between the sender and the target at a high value (60) and varying T’s trade volume change.
The plot on the right holds targets trade volume change at a negative value, indicating that T’s trade
volume diminished under sanctions and varies Joint IGO Membership.
96
Figure A.3: Effect of ∆ T’s Trade and Joint IGO Membership on the Duration of Sanctions
The plot on the left shows that higher levels of joint IGO membership decreases the likelihood
of sanctions survival and increases the likelihood of sanctions removal over time. However, this
facilitating effect is stronger for the targets that are harmed by the sanctions, and thus place a high
value on the proposed sanctions relief. Even if high levels of joint IGO membership increases the
odds of sanctions removal for all targets over time, sanctions are more likely to persist against targets
that can increase their total trade volume while being under sanction compared to targets whose trade
volume shrinks under sanctions.
The graph on the right demonstrates that sanctions are less likely to persist over time if targets’
trade volume shrinks under sanctions and if targets are expected to place a high value on sanctions
relief. However, if the institutional connectedness between the sender and the target is weak,
inefficient economic sanctions have a higher chance of persisting compared to the cases where
senders and targets are more connected to one another through institutional channels.
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APPENDIX B: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 3
Supplementary Empirical Appendix for Chapter 3
This section provides descriptive statistics, presents the results for robustness checks, and provides
the list of sanctions episodes coded for the years between 2005-2012 in an effort to increase the
temporal scope of my analysis. First, Table B.1 presents the full results with the inclusion of temporal
variables, following (Carter and Signorino, 2010).
Table B.1: Logistic Regression
DV: Initiating a New Sanctions Episode Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Bad Behavior 0.302 0.479
(0.28) (0.28)
Change in Source of Leader Support 0.580* 0.589* 0.995**
(0.24) (0.26) (0.34)
Growth of S’s Trade with T -0.475** -0.515** -0.207
(0.17) (0.17) (0.23)
Foreign Policy Affinity -0.712** -0.730*** -0.641*
(0.23) (0.21) (0.28)
Frequency of the Dyad 0.323*** 0.327*** 0.292***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07)
Multilateral 0.572* 0.521* 0.401
(0.25) (0.23) (0.34)
Multiple Issues -0.409 -0.623* -0.806*
(0.24) (0.27) (0.38)
Relative CINC Scores -0.000* -0.000 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Target Acquiescence 0.268 0.275 0.024
(0.23) (0.23) (0.29)
Count of Post-Sanctions Years -0.211*** -0.180** -0.227**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Time-Squared 0.012** 0.010** 0.013**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time-Cubed -0.000* -0.000* -0.000*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -4.138*** -4.134*** -3.508***
(0.36) (0.37) (0.53)
N 2153 1566 619
- Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
- Estimates are derived from a logit model and standard errors are clustered around the targetstate.
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Accounting for the Episodes with No Recorded End Dates
Next, I account for episodes with no recorded end dates. I obtain the main results presented in
Chapter 3 using a sample where the cases with no recorded end dates are accounted for by using
TIES dataset’s ongoing as of year variable. I treat the year after the ongoing as of year as the end
year and construct post-sanction years for the years following that end date. As a robustness check, I
drop the cases with no recorded end dates and re-run the main models.
Table B.2: Logistic Regression
DV: Initiating a New Sanctions Episode Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Bad Behavior 0.240 0.418
(0.27) (0.27)
Change in Source of Leader Support 0.538* 0.534* 0.924**
(0.24) (0.26) (0.34)
Growth of S’s Trade with T -0.452** -0.489** -0.173
(0.17) (0.17) (0.23)
Foreign Policy Affinity -0.612** -0.619** -0.493
(0.23) (0.21) (0.27)
Frequency of the Dyad 0.329*** 0.330*** 0.307***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Multilateral 0.581* 0.532* 0.467
(0.25) (0.23) (0.35)
Multiple Issues -0.370 -0.583* -0.766
(0.25) (0.27) (0.41)
Relative CINC Scores -0.000* -0.000* 0.002*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Target Acquiescence 0.289 0.279 0.076
(0.25) (0.25) (0.34)
Count of Post-Sanctions Years -0.199** -0.166* -0.219**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Time-Squared 0.011** 0.010* 0.013**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time-Cubed -0.000* -0.000* -0.000*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -4.157*** -4.113*** -3.641***
(0.38) (0.38) (0.55)
N 2008 1447 564
- Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
- Estimates are derived from a logit model and standard errors are clustered around the targetstate.
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Coding Sanctions Recurrence (2006-2012)
There were 85 security-related sanctions that have post-sanctions years after the year 2005, the last
year for which the TIES dataset contains information on threats and imposition of economic sanctions.
In order to increase the temporal scope of my analysis, I identified instances of sanctions recurrence
in the years between 2006-2012, primarily using Lexis Nexis and government reports. I identified
a total of 22 sanctions episodes that took place in the post-sanctions years of the security-related
episodes coded by TIES.
1. Caseid: 19770581 Dyad: US-Libya End Year: 2006
Sanctions Recurrence: (2011) U.S. closed its embassy in Tripoli and imposed sanctions on
Libya and froze the American-held assets of Qaddafi, his family, and senior members of the
government due to the violent crackdown of citizens.
2. Caseid: 1984073101 Dyad: US-Iraq End Year: 2003
Sanctions Recurrence: (2007) U.S. imposed sanctions on certain individuals, blocking their
property and economic transactions, due to their “undermining efforts to promote political
reform in Iraq.” - Executive Order 13439 of July 17, 2007.
3. Caseid: 1989022301 Dyad: US-Iran End Year: 1998
Sanctions Recurrence: (2006) U.S. imposed sanctions on Iran to prohibit all transactions
directly or indirectly involving Bank Sadaret, Iran’s largest bank.
4. Caseid: 1990080202 Dyad: US-Iraq End Year: 2002
Sanctions Recurrence: (2007) See the details of the Executive Order 13439 of July 17, 2007
provided for Case 2.
5. Caseid: 1990122101 Dyad: US-Guatemala End Year: 2008
Sanctions Recurrence: (2012) OFAC imposes sanctions on individuals and entities in Guatemala
due to their ties with a Guatemalan trafficker and violation of the Kingpin Act.
6. Caseid: 1992031001 Dyad: US-Iraq End Year: 2002
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Sanctions Recurrence: (2007) See the details of the Executive Order 13439 of July 17, 2007
provided for Case 2.
7. Caseid: 1992071701 Dyad: Russia-Estonia End Year: 1997
Sanctions Recurrence: (2007) Russia threatens to impose sanctions on Estonia after the Es-
tonian president provides a legal basis for a possible demolition of the monument to Soviet
soldiers in the center of Tallinn.
8. Caseid: 1995020801 Dyad: US-Lebanon End Year: 2000
Sanctions Recurrence: (2006) The U.S. implemented an arms embargo on the export of arms
and defense services to Lebanon, in accordance with UNSCR 1701.
9. Caseid: 1995030103 Dyad: US-Iran End Year: 1998
Sanctions Recurrence: (2006) See case 3 for sanctions imposed Bank Sadaret.
10. Caseid: 1996032706 Dyad: US-Venezuela End Year: 2004
Sanctions Recurrence: (2006) The U.S. banned arms sales to Venezuela due to the govern-
ment’s lack of assistance to the U.S. in combating terrorism.
11. Caseid: 1999021102 Dyad:US-Eritrea US-Venezuela End Year: 2000
Sanctions Recurrence: (2006) The U.S. imposes sanctions on Eritrea to improve religious
freedoms. Information taken from the GIGA Dataset.
12. Caseid: 2000051901 Dyad:US-Fiji US-Venezuela End Year: 2001
Sanctions Recurrence: (2006) Assistance to Fiji, including military aid, has been suspended
by the U.S. following the military takeover.
13. Caseid: 2000061405 Dyad:US-Venezuela US-Venezuela End Year: 2009
Sanctions Recurrence: (2011) The U.S. imposes travel bans on key government officials due to
their believed involvement in human rights abuses, acts of public corruption, and involvement
in drug trafficking.
14. Caseid: 2000061407 Dyad:US-Fiji US-Venezuela End Year: 2003
Sanctions Recurrence: (2006) See Case 12.
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15. Caseid: 2000080102 Dyad:US-Liberia US-Venezuela End Year: 2003
Sanctions Recurrence: (2011) The Chair of the House Subcommittee on Africa threatened
Liberia with sanctions, saying that “the US will hold accountable any and all leaders and their
supporters seeking to undermine Liberia’s peace and democracy by all means, including the
use of sanctions.
16. Caseid: 2000081601 Dyad:US-Mali End Year: 2009
Sanctions Recurrence: (2012) Following the military takeover in the country, the U.S. imposed
sanctions (travel bans and asset freezes) on the leaders of the coup and their families.
17. Caseid: 2001121501 Dyad:India-Pakistan End Year: 2003
Sanctions Recurrence: (2008) India warned Pakistan that it needed to act fast in the wake of
Mumbai terror attacks or else face possible economic sanctions.
18. Caseid: 2002020502 Dyad:US-Costa Rica End Year: 2009
Sanctions Recurrence: (2011) U.S. Department of State downgraded Costa Rica from Tier 2
to the Tier 2 watchlist, designating the country as a source of human sex trafficking and forced
labor. The Tier 2 countries are in danger of potential economic sanctions from the U.S.
19. Caseid: 2003032401 Dyad:US-Pakistan End Year: 2005
Sanctions Recurrence: (2007) U.S. imposes sanctions on Pakistan for the country’s support to
the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe.
20. Caseid: 2003071401 Dyad:US-Pakistan End Year: 2004
Sanctions Recurrence: (2009) The U.S. imposes sanctions against the military leader of Guinea,
members of the junta and other individuals that are believed to undermine the restoration of
democracy and the rule of law.
21. Caseid: 2005031501 Dyad:US-Kenya End Year: 2009
Sanctions Recurrence: (2010) The U.S. Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes stated that Kenya
could face international sanctions over failure to arrest genocide fugitive Felicien Kabuga and
sitting on vital information that can fast-track the arrest of Kabuga.
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22. Caseid: 2005042901 Dyad:United Kingdom-Uganda End Year: 2007
Sanctions Recurrence: (2010) The head of the UK’s official government aid agency has warned
Uganda that unless government takes action on corruption, they will withhold aid.
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APPENDIX C: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 4
Supplementary Empirical Appendix for Chapter 4
This section provides additional robustness checks and descriptive statistics for Chapter 4.
Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IHS) Transformation
FDI Data is highly skewed, as depicted in Figure C.1. It ranges between -4601 and 16428 in millions
of US dollars, with a mean of 555 and a standard deviation of 1453.
Figure C.1: Histogram of Net US FDI Inflow into Target States
Taking the natural logarithm of highly skewed variables is common practice. However, this
transformation is not mathematically possible for the FDI data, since it contains many zero and
negative values. Therefore, I use the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation, following Barry
and Kleinberg (2015); Burbridge, Magee and Robb (1988). The transformation is used using the
following formula, where x represents the US FDI variable:
ln[x+
√
x ∗ (x+ 1)] (8)
Figure C.2 presents the histogram of the US FDI variable after the IHS transformation.
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Figure C.2: Histogram of Net US FDI Inflow into Target States - IHS Transformation
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Table C.1 and C.2 presents the models presented in Table 1 and Table 2 in Chapter 4, with
temporal controls that were omitted for brevity.
Table C.1: The Effect of Assessed Likelihood of Policy Continuity on Net FDI Inflows in Target States
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Change in Source of Leader Support -39.795** -43.164** -44.496** -48.285***
(13.01) (14.04) (13.65) (14.28)
Presidential Approval -0.505 -0.588* -0.504 -0.436
(0.27) (0.29) (0.28) (0.29)
SOLS Change x Presidential Approval 1.599** 1.752** 1.833*** 1.971***
(0.50) (0.54) (0.52) (0.54)
Presidential Approval2 0.005 0.005* 0.005 0.004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SOLS Change x Presidential Approval2 -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.020***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
FDI Inflowt−1 0.352*** 0.247*** 0.165*** 0.155***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Financial Openness 0.616*** 0.301* 0.332*
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
Population (ln) 0.455*** 0.282 0.302
(0.12) (0.17) (0.17)
Economic Growth 0.090* 0.117** 0.121**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
US Distance -0.000* -0.000**
(0.00) (0.00)
US Trade 0.636*** 0.643***
(0.14) (0.16)
Executive Constraints -0.002
(0.09)
Regime Durability -0.007
(0.01)
Count of Post-Sanctions Years 1.844 2.220 2.135 2.240
(1.38) (1.50) (1.45) (1.49)
Time-Squared -0.377 -0.417 -0.386 -0.408
(0.25) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27)
Time-Cubed 0.022 0.024 0.021 0.023
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 13.262 6.892 4.287 2.163
(7.30) (7.90) (7.71) (7.96)
N 590 521 521 504
Adjusted R-squared 0.15 0.19 0.24 0.23
- Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
- Estimates are derived from an OLS model with robust standard errors.
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Table C.2: The Effect of Sanctions Outcome on Net FDI Inflows in Target States
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Decisive Final Outcome 1.105** 1.135** 1.177** 1.060*
(0.37) (0.40) (0.40) (0.41)
FDI Inflowt−1 0.328*** 0.221*** 0.165*** 0.149**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Financial Openness 0.607*** 0.324* 0.406*
(0.14) (0.16) (0.17)
Population (ln) 0.491*** 0.394* 0.414*
(0.13) (0.18) (0.18)
Economic Growth 0.083 0.104* 0.106*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
US Distance -0.000** -0.000*
(0.00) (0.00)
US Trade 0.445** 0.478**
(0.15) (0.16)
Executive Constraint -0.006
(0.10)
Regime Durability -0.012
(0.01)
Count of Post-Sanctions Years 1.299 1.731 1.739 1.872
(1.43) (1.53) (1.50) (1.54)
Time-Squared -0.306 -0.356 -0.339 -0.365
(0.26) (0.28) (0.27) (0.28)
Time-Cubed 0.019 0.021 0.020 0.021
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.417 -8.878** -9.421** -9.796**
(2.31) (3.26) (3.34) (3.44)
N 542 483 483 467
R-squared 0.13 0.18 0.21 0.20
- Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
- Estimates are derived from an OLS model with robust standard errors.
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